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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On March 2, 1863, Congress enacted the False Claims Act (FCA).1  
The FCA provides penalties and creates a damages remedy for “false or 
fraudulent” claims submitted to the United States.2  The FCA includes a qui 
tam provision authorizing private individuals to sue for damages and 
penalties in the name of, and on behalf of, the United States.3 
In the nearly century and a half since Congress enacted the FCA, the 
federal government’s structure has changed substantially.  In addition, the 
federal government’s role in national economic life has grown 
exponentially.4  These changes have resulted in a restructuring of the 
relationship between the federal government and the private entities with 
which it contracts.5 
In 1863, when the FCA was adopted, government contracts were 
purchase and sale agreements that specified the goods to be delivered and 
the price to be paid.6  Now, however, the federal government contracts with 
private entities to administer massive social welfare programs and provide 
benefits subject to pervasive and extensive federal agency regulation and 
oversight.7  From the mid-nineteenth century through the early twentieth 
century, federal regulation, to the extent it existed at all, addressed 
economic issues—the prices at which goods and services could be sold.8  
Today, the federal government, through its administrative agencies, also 
oversees and regulates government contractors’ production processes and 
often dictates the methods that contractors must use to produce the goods 
or services for which the government contracts.9 
 
 1. See An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds Upon the Government of the U.S., ch. LXVII, 
§ 1, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000)). 
 2. Id.; see also JAMES F. NAGLE, A HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING 202-04 (1st 
ed. 1992) (detailing the abuses that led to adoption of the FCA, known as “The Abraham 
Lincoln Law”) 
 3. 31 U.S.C. § 3730. 
 4. See generally 1 JACOB A. STEIN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §1.01[4], at 1-25 to -32 
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 2007) (detailing various reports addressing the increased role of 
the federal government in “regulating the entire economy”). 
 5. See NAGLE, supra note 2, at 1 (stating that the country’s government contracting 
needs changed based on exploration of the West, national defense, transportation, and mail 
delivery). 
 6. See id. at 7-8. 
 7. See, e.g., infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the extensive regulation of provider-contractors 
under the Medicare Act). 
 8. See generally 1 STEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 1-17 to -24 (detailing various federal 
regulatory functions beginning with the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 and ending 
with the United States Maritime Commission in 1936). 
 9. See NAGLE, supra note 2, at 9; see also 1 STEIN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1.01[2], at 1-7 
to 1-8. 
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Federal appellate and trial courts have struggled to apply the FCA in 
light of these changed circumstances.  Recent cases evidence the difficulties 
experienced by courts and foreshadow even greater difficulties if the tension 
between the Civil War era FCA and the modern administrative state is not 
addressed and resolved. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. The Disconnect Between the FCA and the Modern Administrative State 
1. The Ninth Circuit and the Department of Education or “Who’s In 
Charge Here?” 
In United States ex rel. Hendow v. University of Phoenix,10 the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the district court’s order dismissing the case and permitted 
an FCA qui tam action to proceed.  The court of appeals adopted a 
sweeping interpretation of “false or fraudulent” that effectively nullified the 
Department of Education’s (DOE) discretionary decision to treat alleged 
statutory and regulatory infractions as administrative enforcement matters, 
not as fraud upon the government.11  In place of weighing policy options 
and balancing competing interests, as is required of an agency 
administering a government benefits program, Hendow permits courts to 
decide whether a claim is false or fraudulent based on whether a contractor 
was in compliance with administrative requirements when it claimed 
payment from the government.12  In contrast to the range of discretionary 
sanctions an administrative agency can use in a regulatory enforcement 
action, the FCA mandates that a court, upon determining a claim is false or 
fraudulent, impose per claim penalties and multiple damages.13 
Remarkably, the Ninth Circuit permitted FCA damages and penalties for 
the University of Phoenix’s (UOP) violation of the DOE’s requirements, even 
though the DOE had concluded that such violations did “not result[] in 
monetary loss to the Department.”14  Moreover, the DOE already had acted 
 
 10. 461 F.3d 1166, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2099 (2007). 
 11. Id. at 1170-71. 
 12. Id. at 1171. 
 13. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000). 
 14. Memorandum from William D. Hansen, Deputy Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Terri 
Shaw, Chief Operating Officer, Fed. Student Aid, Subject: Enforcement policy for violations of 
incentive compensation prohibition by institutions participating in student aid programs 
(October 30, 2002), attached to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 51a, Hendow, 127 S. Ct. 
2099 (2007) (No. 06-1006), 2007 WL 160712 [hereinafter DOE Memorandum].  The policy 
applied by the DOE to UOP regarding Federal Student Aid states that the purpose of the 
memorandum “is to provide direction with regard to the Department’s response to violations 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] THE UBIQUITOUS FALSE CLAIMS ACT 135 
pursuant to the agency’s published policy, imposing administrative penalties 
for the alleged noncompliance at issue in the court case, but neither 
recouping past payments nor terminating future payments to UOP.15  
Furthering the paradox, Hendow also permits a private individual to seek 
damages and penalties on behalf of the United States despite refusal by the 
DOE, the agency authorized to administer the program for the United 
States, to do so.16 
2. The Tug of War Between the FCA and the Medicare Act 
(a) The Long Term Care Survey and Enforcement Process 
The disconnect between the FCA, especially its qui tam provisions, and 
the modern administrative state is perhaps most evident in the context of 
government-run healthcare benefits programs, such as the Medicare and 
Medicaid Programs.  Although any number of Medicare regulatory and 
enforcement programs could be utilized to illustrate the inherent tension 
between administrative oversight of government contractors and the FCA, 
the long term care survey and enforcement process is a paradigm. 
The current long term care survey and enforcement process, adopted by 
Congress in 1987,17 includes a plethora of substantive performance 
standards governing both the process of delivering care and the outcome of 
 
of section 487(a)(20) of the Higher Education Act” prohibiting incentive payments to student 
recruiters.  Id.  The memorandum states: 
The Department has in the past measured the damages resulting from a violation as 
the total amount of student aid provided to each improperly recruited student.  After 
further analysis, I have concluded that the preferable approach is to view a violation of 
the incentive compensation prohibition as not resulting in monetary loss to the 
Department.  Improper recruiting does not render a recruited student ineligible to 
receive student aid funds for attendance at the institution on whose behalf the 
recruiting is conducted.  Accordingly, the Department should treat a violation of the 
law as a compliance matter for which remedial or punitive sanctions should be 
considered. 
Id. at 52a.  The memorandum then goes on to identify the facts that should be considered in 
assessing the appropriate sanction, including whether the law was knowingly violated “as 
would be evidenced, for example, by attempts to disguise its compensation plan and by other 
aggravating factors.”  Id. 
 15. Id. at 52a. 
 16. See Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1174-75 (relators, former enrollment counselors, sued 
University of Phoenix on behalf of the United States under the FCA); see also U.S. ex. rel. 
Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266 n.7 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing the ability of private 
individuals to “bring an action on behalf of the U.S. government” against anyone who 
“knowingly presented” a “false or fraudulent claim to the U.S. government”). 
 17. Changes to long term care facility quality standards, survey procedures, and 
enforcement processes were enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330. 
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care.18  The Medicare and Medicaid Acts also specify processes and 
protocols that must be used to evaluate compliance with program 
standards,19 as well as who may conduct the assessment.20 
One of the principal reasons that the current survey and enforcement 
process was adopted was to provide a menu of discretionary, intermediate 
sanctions that could be used to address alleged noncompliance with 
program standards.21  The discretion to utilize intermediate sanctions was 
conferred on the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the Secretary) to 
provide a means of encouraging nursing facility compliance so that 
termination of Medicare payments, which often resulted in closure of the 
facility and traumatic displacement of residents, could be avoided.22  In 
order to allow intermediate sanctions to function, the survey and 
enforcement process also provides that payment may continue to be made, 
even to seriously noncompliant providers.23 
(b) The Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Benefit 
The recent creation and implementation of the Medicare prescription 
drug benefit, known as Part D, portends even more tension between the 
FCA and the modern administrative state.  Part D, 24 which was adopted by 
Congress in 2003 and first implemented by the Centers for Medicare and 
 
 18. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3, 1396r (2000); see also 42 C.F.R. pt. 488 (2007) 
(implementing the statute’s survey and enforcement process). 
 19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(g)(2)(C), 1396r(g)(2)(C) (Medicare and Medicaid, 
respectively); 42 C.F.R. § 488.300-335; see also Robert Fabrikant & Glenn E. Solomon, 
Application of the Federal False Claims Act to Regulatory Compliance Issues in the Health 
Care Industry, 51 ALA. L. REV. 105, 151 (1999) (noting that quality of care requirements “are 
enforced through a complex enforcement process which includes frequent on-site 
inspections”). 
 20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(g)(2)(E), 1396r(g)(2)(E); 42 C.F.R. § 488.314(a) (2007). 
 21. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(h)(3)(c); 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(h)(3)(c) (remedies 
listed are sanctions for substandard performance). 
 22. See, e.g., Certification and Enforcement of Skilled Nursing Facilities and Nursing 
Facilities, 59 Fed. Reg. 56,116, 56,221 (Nov. 10, 1994); Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long 
Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 22 (2000) (noting that “‘terminations from the program are rare 
and generally reserved for the most egregious recidivist institutions’” (quoting the reply brief of 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services)). 
 23. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(h)(2)(C) (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 489.55; cf. United States v. 
Southland Mgmt. Corp., 326 F.3d 669, 676 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (continued 
government payments despite known noncompliance reflected policy choice that payments 
were needed to fund improvements and negated argument that claims were false or 
fraudulent under the FCA). 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101 – 152 (Supp. IV 2004). 
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Medicaid Services (CMS) in 2005, created, virtually overnight, an 
unprecedented benefit program that over 35 million people use.25 
The Part D program provides benefits through private sector prescription 
drug plans.  The plans bid for the right to participate in Part D.26  If the bid 
is successful, the plan is authorized to provide prescription drugs to 
Medicare beneficiaries and submit claims for government reimbursement for 
such drugs.27  Part D imposes extensive reporting requirements on the 
pharmacy plans, both with respect to the initial application and with respect 
to the submission of claims for payment.28 
Like the long term care survey and enforcement process, Part D provides 
CMS with a menu of remedies for noncompliance with program 
requirements.  The options available to CMS range from civil money 
penalties of up to $100,000 to termination of a plan’s contract.29  The Part 
D remedies are discretionary and CMS has stated that, as a matter of policy, 
it will limit enforcement to “large, repeat and/or egregious” violations of 
Part D requirements.30  Also for policy reasons, CMS has disavowed intent 
to publicize enforcement actions directed at noncompliant plans.31 
Arguably, CMS’s Part D enforcement policy decisions—which reflect 
policy choices similar to those made in the 1960s and early 1970s to 
encourage development of sufficient long term care facilities to provide that 
 
 25. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., Over 38 Million People 
With Medicare Now Receiving Prescription Drug Coverage (June 14, 2006), available at 
www.hhs.gov/news/press/2006pres/20060614.html  (last visited Jan 31, 2008) (showing 
where Medicare beneficiaries are receiving drug coverage, including coverage implemented 
by Part D). 
 26. Toby S. Edelman, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., Oversight and Enforcement of 
Medicare Part D Plan Requirements: Federal Role And Responsibilities 5 (2006), available at 
www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7558.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2007). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-111. 
 29. 42 C.F.R. §§ 423.750(a)(1), 423.756(e) (2007); see also 42 C.F.R. § 423.756(f) 
(2007) (The Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General also may 
impose sanctions instead of, or in addition to, CMS.). 
 30. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PART 
D OVERSIGHT STRATEGY FOR CONTRACTORS/INDUSTRY 2 (Oct. 24, 2005), available at 
www.cms.hhs.gov/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/Downloads/OversightStrategy_10.24.05.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2007). 
 31. Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit, 70 Fed. Reg. 4194, 4367 (Jan. 28, 2005).  CMS 
stated that it takes this position because: 
Some organizations that have received sanctions have later become solid examples of 
compliant contract administration.  We believe that a public listing of sanctioned Part 
D Plans may not portray the current level of compliance by contracted organizations 
and could unfairly impede business opportunities for fully compliant contractors that 
were sanctioned in prior years. . . . Sanction authority is not designed to be punitive. 
Id. 
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newly created benefit—also reflect the need to attract sufficient contractors 
to provide the entirely new benefit.32  Yet, CMS’s policy choices regarding 
appropriate enforcement policy, whether with respect to nursing facility 
compliance, violation of Part D standards, or compliance with other 
Medicare program requirements, do not prevent, or, under Hendow, even 
inhibit prosecution of an FCA action based on the same or similar 
regulatory violations that program administrators have elected to address 
through other means.  Indeed, such an action may be initiated and 
prosecuted, even when the government refuses to participate, by a private 
individual.  Moreover, in contrast to the agency’s responsibility to consider 
public policy goals as well as the potential adverse impact on private 
interests when selecting, and before imposing, a sanction for 
noncompliance, neither a qui tam relator nor the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) are bound to consider the larger consequences before initiating an 
action under the FCA.33  The potential for conflict between administrative 
and judicial goals and enforcement of regulatory programs is obvious. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
A. The Historical Origins of the FCA 
The FCA is a Civil War era statute that, in significant respects, has 
remained substantively unchanged since its original 1863 enactment.34  The 
statute was adopted “following a series of sensational congressional 
investigations into the sale of provisions and munitions to the War 
Department.”35  To combat Civil War era military contracting abuses, 
Congress created a damages cause of action that could be brought directly 
by the United States or on its behalf by private persons in a qui tam action.36 
The original FCA authorized suit against “any person . . . who shall 
make or procure to be made . . . any claim against . . . the Government of 
the United States . . . [knowing such claim to be] false, fraudulent, or 
 
 32. In its landmark study, the Institute of Medicine notes that early long term care 
enforcement policy focused on encouraging compliance and entry into the market because 
there were insufficient nursing facilities to meet the demand created by the newly adopted 
Medicare and Medicaid Acts. COMM’N ON NURSING HOME REGULATION, INST. OF MED., 
IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF CARE IN NURSING HOMES 13-14 (1986). 
 33. Cf. U.S. ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 542 n.5 (1943) (Qui tam relators 
often act “under the strong stimulus of personal ill will or the hope of gain.” (quoting United 
States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885))). 
 34. Compare An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds Upon the Government of the U.S., ch. 
LXVII, § 1, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) with 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000). 
 35. United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958); see also NAGLE, supra note 2, 
at 202-205 (describing passage of original FCA). 
 36. An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds Upon the Government of the U.S., ch. LXVII, § 1. 
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fictitious.”37  It also authorized suit against any person “who shall, for the 
purpose of obtaining . . . the approval or payment of such claim, make, 
use, or cause to be made or used, any false bill, receipt, voucher, entry, roll, 
account, claim, statement, certificate, affidavit, or deposition, knowing the 
same to contain any false or fraudulent statement.”38 
Congress recodified the FCA in 1982 and, at that time, eliminated the 
word “fictitious” from the 1863 proscription of “false, fictitious, or 
fraudulent” claims.39  However, this minor textual change was designed only 
to “eliminate unnecessary words” and provide “consistency,” rather than to 
effect any substantive change.40  The FCA was amended again in 1986.41  
However, the terms “false or fraudulent” have never been changed, nor has 
Congress ever defined the terms. 
The current version of the FCA allows suit against any person who 
“knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of 
the United States Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment 
or approval.”42  A second provision allows suit against any person who 
“knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or 
statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the 
Government.”43 
B. The Civil War Era FCA Was Not Designed to Apply to Claims Made 
upon the Modern Administrative State 
The threshold question in most FCA actions is whether the claim is false 
or fraudulent.44  In making that determination, the courts’ obligation is to 
apply Congress’s acts as written, not to expand or contract a statute’s reach 
to effect the court’s view of wise policy necessitated by changed or 
unanticipated circumstances.45  Thus, whether a claim is false or fraudulent 
 
 37. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. § 3 (making § 1 applicable to non-military 
members). 
 38. Id. § 1 (emphasis added). 
 39. Money and Finance, Pub. L. No. 97-258, § 3729, 96 Stat. 877, 978 (1982); H.R. 
REP. NO. 97-651, at 143 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1895, 2037. 
 40. H.R. REP. NO. 97-651, at 143. 
 41. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153. 
 42. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 43. Id. § 3729(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 44. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 
2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2099 (2007) (stating that the district court had rejected 
relators’ theories that the University submitted “false or fraudulent claims . . . under the ‘false 
certification’ theory”) (citing U.S. ex. rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 
1996)). 
 45. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) (noting that the 
“judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed” to determine whether it creates a 
cause of action; “[s]tatutory intent . . . is determinative . . . . [C]ourts may not create [a cause 
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under the FCA because a government contractor allegedly violated 
regulatory requirements necessitates determining the meaning that the 1863 
Congress ascribed to “false or fraudulent.”46 
When Congress enacted the FCA in 1863, the majority of federal 
government contracts involved services and products to be delivered directly 
to the government on its own account, not contracts entered in order to 
obtain federal payment for goods or services delivered to third parties.47  
Moreover, the types of government benefit, entitlement, and welfare 
programs run by agencies such as the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) and the DOE were not only unknown in 1863, they were the 
type of programs that were not seen as any part of the federal government’s 
business.48  Simply put, federal programs providing—and paying for—
governmental benefits delivered to third parties by private sector contractors 
simply did not exist when the FCA was adopted.49 
 
of action] no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with 
the statute”). 
 46. See generally Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 781-
88 (2000) (holding that the FCA’s terms adopted in 1863 should be given the meaning 
ascribed to them by authors of the Act at the time the Act was adopted); see also Touche Ross 
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) (“The question of the existence of a statutory 
cause of action is, of course, one of statutory construction . . . [and the court’s] analysis must 
begin with the language of the statute itself.”); United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 
228, 232 (1968)(although the issue at hand had not been previously considered by the 
Supreme Court, “the history and language of the False Claims Act . . . indicate the answer to 
our present inquiry”); United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958) (discussing the 
circumstances surrounding passage of the False Claims Act, notably how “the United States 
had been billed for nonexistent or worthless goods”). 
 47. See generally NAGLE, supra note 2, at 181-220 (describing federal contracting during 
the Civil War period). 
 48. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 213 (1985) (“A fortiori the 
federal government had nothing to do with the poor laws.  It played a minute role in social 
welfare.”). 
 49. Id. at 439-441.  Lawrence Friedman has noted that “[t]he period between 1850 and 
1900 is considered the climax of laissez-faire – the age of social Darwinism” that eventually 
gave way as the middle class emerged and sought control over the “great aggregations” that 
minimized the individual’s ability to control the forces affecting daily life.  Id. at 440-41.  As 
Professor Friedman has summarized: 
The cure was, at first, statewide control.  When the states could not meet the demands 
of their constituents, these constituents embarked on a federal adventure.  The process 
was repeated in many areas of law.  In welfare, for example, first came local poor 
laws, run by country justices and squires of the community.  When this system was felt 
to be obsolete, states centralized their welfare administration.  When the states could 
no longer handle the job (much later, to be sure), the federal government stepped in.  
This did not take place until the age of the New Deal, in the 1930s. 
Id. at 441. 
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In 1863 the prevailing view of the role of the federal government was 
still dictated by the principles and philosophy of Jacksonian democracy.  The 
Jacksonians, insofar as possible, sought to confine political power in state 
and local governments.  Jacksonians abhorred centralized power of any 
type, and, especially, power consolidated in the federal government 
because such power was viewed as a threat to individual liberty.50 
To be sure, the Civil War, and the palpable consequences of the states’ 
rights arguments that precipitated the War, caused many, particularly in the 
North, to begin to reconsider the appropriate role of the federal 
government.51  In addition, the years following the War saw “the emergence 
of vitally important economic problems demanding Federal rather than State 
regulation” because of their national scope.52 
However, a strong, dominant national government with the resources, 
the will, and the ability to protect its interests was still years in the future.  
Indeed, it would have been as difficult for the 1863 Congress to foresee the 
pervasive role and power that federal agencies wield today as it is for 
twenty-first century Americans to appreciate the federal government’s almost 
insignificant role in the nation’s economic life in 1863. 
In 1863, the federal government was so lacking in resources that, 
without a qui tam provision authorizing private individuals to sue on behalf 
of the United States, the FCA may have been a dead letter.  Enforcement of 
the FCA by the federal government in 1863 was not likely because the 
Department of Justice did not exist.  The DOJ was not created and vested 
with power to protect the federal government’s interests until 1870, seven 
years after the FCA was adopted.53 
In 1863, the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution, the bellwethers 
of a seismic shift in power from the states to the federal government, were 
 
 50. See generally JAMES F. SIMON, LINCOLN AND CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY: SLAVERY, SECESSION, 
AND THE PRESIDENT'S WAR POWERS 14-25 (2006) (discussing Jacksonian populism, opposition 
to “any special interests” and abhorrence of “concentrated and unaccountable” power in the 
context of the “Bank War” waged by Jackson and Roger B. Taney against the Second Bank of 
the United States); see also PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD: SHAPING LIBERTY FROM THE GOLD 
RUSH TO THE GILDED AGE 187 (1997) (discussing Andrew Jackson’s “concern for states’ rights 
and opposition to the federal judiciary”). 
 51. See generally NAGLE, supra note 2, at 185-189 (The federal government increased its 
arsenal by increasing domestic production, contracting with more private manufacturers, and 
purchasing arms from overseas.  However, this caused the government to reevaluate its 
contracting methods because of corruption.). 
 52. 1 STEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 1-17 to 1-18 n.71 (quoting THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. 
ON ADMIN. MGMT., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1937)). 
 53. See An Act to Establish the Department of Justice, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (1870). 
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still years away.54  Steven J. Field, the godfather of substantive due process 
and the constitutional liberty to contract—doctrines that, for fifty years, 
frustrated government regulation of business and invalidated social welfare 
legislation—had not even joined the Supreme Court.55  Congress’s 
discretion to spend in aid of the general welfare would not be confirmed for 
another seventy years.56  Helvering v. Davis57 and Steward Machine Co. v. 
Davis,58 upholding the federal income tax, were almost seventy-five years in 
the future; the Social Security Act was almost seventy years from 
enactment;59  and the Federal Administrative Procedure Act was not 
adopted for another eighty years.60  Perhaps even more to the point, as late 
as 1918—fifty-five years after the FCA’s adoption—the Supreme Court in 
Hammer v. Dagenhart held unconstitutional a federal statute designed to 
suppress the use of child labor in manufacturing.61 
The Congress that adopted the FCA would find ludicrous the idea that 
the federal government could or should prescribe standards that businesses 
are required to meet in their daily operations or that the federal government 
should oversee such operations.  Only in the late nineteenth century did the 
idea begin to emerge “that governmental regulation of business should not 
be confined to the enforcement of criminal penalties but should partake of 
continuous and not unfriendly supervision.”62  In short, the sorts of pervasive 
federal regulatory and oversight systems that characterize the modern 
administrative state—complete with their own systems to assess regulatory 
compliance, processes to adjudicate regulatory violations, standards to 
evaluate the significance of such violations, and administrative discretion to 
decide whether a remedy or sanction is appropriate—were unknown to the 
Congress that adopted the FCA.63 
 
 54. See generally KENS, supra note 50, at 184-96 (detailing the history of cases limiting 
the federal government). 
 55. Bernard Schwartz, Supreme Court Superstars: The Ten Greatest Justices, 31 TULSA L.J. 
93, 108-15 (1995). 
 56. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936) (“public funds may be 
appropriated ‘to provide for the general welfare of the United States’”). 
 57. 301 U.S. 619 (1937). 
 58. 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
 59. See COMM’N ON NURSING HOME REGULATION, INST. OF MED., supra note 32, at 238. 
 60. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 238 (1946) (codified as amended at 
5 U.S.C. § 500 (2000)). 
 61. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).  Moreoever, the case, known as the “Child Labor Case,” was 
not overruled for twenty-three years.  See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 62. 1 STEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 1-17 to 1-18 (quoting THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON 
ADMIN. MGMT., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1937)). 
 63. NAGLE, supra note 2, at 181-220.  Defects in performance of obligations imposed by 
government contracts were discovered by the government at the same time that any other 
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It was not until the 
take-off decade of 1905-1915 [that] the regulatory component of statute 
law became . . . prominent and . . . brought a new type of statute law 
concerning organized relationships.  The focus [of statutes] changed from 
enabling organized action to injecting more public management or 
supervision of affairs and providing more sustained, specialized means of 
defining and enforcing public policy.  Symbolic of this turn of affairs were 
the statutes creating the modern federal and state administrative apparatus; 
typical was the shift from factory safety laws that simply commanded 
employers to provide safe work places to laws implemented by provision for 
administrative rule making and inspection.64 
But these changes occurred in statutes, not in regulations.  Administrative 
agencies did not become prominent until the New Deal,65  and rulemaking 
did not become the dominant form of regulation until the 1970s.66 
 
purchaser would have discovered that he did not get the benefit of his bargain—when the 
defective goods were delivered and put to use.  One transaction between John Pierpoint 
Morgan and the government demonstrates that, at the time the FCA was adopted, the 
government, as contractor, stood in no different position than a private entity.  Before the Civil 
War, the army condemned a cache of obsolete guns and ordered them auctioned.  The guns 
sold for less than $2.00 apiece.  In May 1861, Mr. Morgan purchased the guns for $3.50 
each and, claiming that they were “new Carbines in perfect condition,” sold them back to the 
army for $22.00 each.  When soldiers attempted to use the “new carbines in perfect 
condition,” they often succeeded only in “shooting off their own thumbs.”  Id. at 199.  When 
the government refused to pay, Mr. Morgan sued and “won the full sum because, regardless 
of the wisdom of its bargain, the government still had signed the contract.  Caveat emptor.”  
Id. at 200. 
 64. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 36 (1977). 
 65. RICHARD J. PIERCE JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 29-31 (2nd ed. 1992). 
 66. RICHARD J. PIERCE JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 23 (4th ed. 2002).  Any 
argument that the Civil War era Congress could have conceptualized the scope and reach of 
the modern administrative agency is belied not only by the fact that the DOJ did not exist, but 
also by comparison of the number of civilians employed by the federal government at the time 
the FCA was adopted, in the years just prior to the New Deal, and in 1970 when 
administrative regulation of business was the rule, rather than the exception. The fact is that, at 
the time that the FCA was adopted, the federal government was so limited in scope that it 
could not possibly have engaged in the sort of pervasive regulation of business that is at the 
heart of many FCA cases today. 
  In 1861, for example, there were only 40,651 civilian jobs and, of those, almost 
23,000 were in the Post Office.  See PHILLIP SHAW PALUDAN, THE PRESIDENCY OF ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN 35-36 (1994).  Moreover, in 1930, before administrative regulation of business 
became commonplace, the federal government employed only 601,000 civilians.  In 1970, 
when administrative regulation of business began to reach its heyday, federal government 
employees had increased 500% over the 1930 level to 3,000,000.  Charles Fried, Domestic 
Affairs: American Programs and Priorities by James Duffy, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1561, 1564 n.9 
(1979) (book review); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NO. HS-50. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT—
EMPLOYMENT: 1901 TO 2002, available at www.census.gov/statab/hist/HS-50.pdf (last visited 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
144 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:131 
In addition, the idea that the power to make substantive law could be 
delegated by Congress to an executive agency also never would have 
occurred to the Civil War Congress.  In fact, in 1935 the Supreme Court’s 
inability to accept the notion that legislative power could be delegated to an 
administrative agency controlled by the Executive Department almost 
stopped the New Deal before it started.67 
The growth of the administrative state has revolutionized and 
restructured the relationship between the federal government and 
government contractors.  The importance of this change is hard to 
overstate.68  For example, in 1936 Justice Harlan Stone, later Chief Justice, 
commented that the rise of the administrative law system was the “most 
striking change in the common law of this country.”69  Similarly, Justice 
Jackson noted that the “rise of administrative bodies probably has been the 
most significant legal trend of the last century” and that agencies had 
become a “veritable fourth branch of the [g]overnment.”70  Professors Jaffe 
and Nathanson have observed that “the administrative process has been the 
characteristic instrument for redesigning the operation of our economic 
system and for effecting the required transfers of power.”71  Others have 
noted that, with the growth of the administrative state, has come a 
concomitant increase in the federal government’s “economic role in 
national life . . . and with it the opportunities for those receiving government 
funds” to violate one or more of the innumerable regulations governing 
entitlement to provide government benefits.72 
Because the “fourth branch of government” did not exist and, thus, was 
not a source of federal law in 1863 when the FCA was adopted, legitimate 
questions arise about whether or when a claim for payment can be “false 
 
Feb. 13, 2008).  It is inconceivable that a Senator or Congressman legislating in 1863 on 
behalf of a federal government with less than 20,000 non-postal civilian employees could 
have anticipated, or intended, that the FCA would become one of the principal enforcement 
tools of the modern administrative state. 
 67. See generally A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-30 
(1935) (discussing the issue of delegating legislative power); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 
293 U.S. 388, 248-49 (1935) (discussing the Constitution’s assignment to Congress of “[a]ll 
legislative [p]owers herein granted”); see PIERCE, supra note 66, at 25-32 (Pierce argues that 
Congress’ authority to “delegate to agencies the power to promulgate legislative rules that 
resolve fundamental policy issues” was not addressed until the 1980s.). 
 68. See LOUIS L. JAFFE & NATHANIEL L. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 8 (3rd ed. 1968). 
 69. Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 16-18 
(1936). 
 70. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting). 
 71. JAFFE & NATHANSON, supra note 68, at 8. 
 72. 1 JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS § 1.01[B], at 1-11 (3rd 
ed. 2007). 
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and fraudulent” under the FCA based on a government contractor’s failure 
to comply with administrative regulatory standards of a type unknown to the 
Civil War Congress (e.g., regulating the production process or quality).  It is 
fair to say that the question whether violation of such a regulation makes a 
subsequent claim for payment false or fraudulent is a question that never 
would have occurred to the FCA’s authors. 
Given a nineteenth century lawyer-legislator’s frame of reference, it is 
almost certain that the FCA’s authors considered a claim for payment false 
or fraudulent only when there was a complete failure to deliver on a 
contract.  The Supreme Court, for example, has noted that “[t]he [FCA] was 
originally adopted” because Congress was outraged that “the United States 
had been billed for nonexistent or worthless goods . . . and generally 
robbed in purchasing the necessities of war.”73  In other words, when a 
contractor billed the United States, but gave no value in return, the claim 
was false or fraudulent.  Defective performance, including disputes about 
the value of performance, the relative quality of goods or the degree of 
compliance with the contract, might breach the contract, but did not make a 
payment claim false or fraudulent.74  Moreover, whether the contractor 
adhered to appropriate or reasonable manufacturing standards would have 
been irrelevant to those who passed the FCA.75 
C. The FCA and Modern Administrative Regulatory Programs 
If one views the FCA from the perspective of the 1863 Congress, 
reconciling this Civil War era Act to the modern administrative state is 
difficult because administrative agencies today: 
 have been delegated the power to adopt substantive compliance 
standards;76 
 may use specialized investigative and fact-finding procedures and 
protocols and possess specialized expertise with respect to the 
entities that they regulate;77 
 
 73. United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958) (emphasis added). 
 74. See supra note 63 (discussing how the government was treated like any other party to 
a contract would be treated). 
 75. Although the process changed somewhat over time, government contracts remained 
straightforward purchase and sale agreements.  No attempt was made to regulate the means 
of production or the wages or working conditions of those producing the goods for which the 
government contracted.  Generally, the government put a contract out for bid and contracted 
for the lowest price offered.  NAGLE, supra note 2, at 181-220 
 76. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(d)(4)(A) (nursing facilities must “operate and provide 
services in compliance with all applicable Federal, State, and local laws and regulations”), 
1396a(a)(28)(D) (2000); 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.1-483.206 (2007) (setting forth substantive 
requirements for certain healthcare facilities). 
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 make discretionary judgments regarding the degree and level of a 
contracting entity’s compliance with complex statutory and regulatory 
standards;78 
 have discretion to determine what, if any, action to take in the face 
of noncompliance; and79 
 have authority to use a variety of remedial measures for 
noncompliance while allowing contract payments to continue.80 
In 1863, the development of the administrative system that occurred in 
the second half of the twentieth century could not have been foreseen.81  
Nor could congressionally imposed limits on judicial review of administrative 
action have been anticipated. 
1. The Medicare Act’s Jurisdictional Provisions and the Federal Courts’ 
Authority to Decide Questions Arising Under the Medicare Act 
The Medicare Act, unlike most statutes, includes an explicit and 
comprehensive jurisdictional ban on judicial interference with the Secretary 
of HHS’s discretion to administer the Medicare program.  Specifically, 
Congress recognized the vital importance agency discretion would play in 
the program’s proper administration by channeling any claim arising under 
the Medicare Act through the Secretary.82  Section 405(h) of the Medicare 
Act provides: “No findings of fact or decision of the [Secretary] shall be 
reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency,” except as 
 
 77. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(g)(2), 1396r(g)(2) (2000) (setting out standards and 
procedures for forms, protocols, and surveys of skilled nursing facilities); 42 C.F.R. §§ 
488.100-488.115 (2007) (describing detailed survey forms, protocols, and procedures). 
 78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(g)(2), 1396r(g)(2); 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.100-488.115; see also, 
e.g., 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.404(b), 488.408(e), 488.410(a) (2007) (detailing factors to be used 
in determining compliance and appropriate sanctions for various degrees of violations). 
 79. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex., Inc., 336 F.3d 375 (5th 
Cir. 2003); U.S. ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1996) (“There are 
administrative and other remedies for regulatory violations.”). 
 80. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(h)(2)(A)(i), (authorizing the Secretary to choose a 
remedy, taking into consideration whether the facility’s deficiencies “immediately jeopardize 
the health or safety of its residents”), 1396r(h)(2) (2000); see also U.S. ex rel. Conner v. 
Salina Reg'l Health Ctr., Inc., 459 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087 (D. Kan. 2006) (“Denial of 
government payment is not the exclusive remedy of HHS in the event of a regulatory violation . 
. . . [T]he Social Security Act provides . . . [CMS] with discretionary authority whether to impose 
sanctions in a particular case.”). 
 81. Indeed, the American Bar Association and well-respected authorities continued to 
resist the development of pervasive and powerful administrative agencies even into and 
beyond the 1930s.  See PIERCE, supra note 66, at 8-16. 
 82. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii (2000); cross-referencing 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 405(h). 
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specifically authorized by Congress.83  Yet, when regulatory violations are 
alleged, a claim for payment cannot be false under the FCA unless a court 
does precisely what the Supreme Court has said Section 405(h) permits only 
the Secretary to do—determine compliance with program standards.84 
It can be argued, indeed with some force, that Section 405(h) does not 
preclude jurisdiction in a case brought by or on behalf of the United States 
under the FCA.85  Such an argument, however, ignores the facts: (1) that the 
statute has repeatedly been held to reflect Congress’ intent and policy that 
all claims requiring application of the Medicare Act’s provisions should be 
 
 83. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (emphasis added).  The Administrative Procedure Act also 
provides that the Act’s provisions authorizing judicial review of agency action apply “except to 
the extent that . . . agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.”  5 U.S.C. 
§ 701(a)(2) (2000). 
 84. Compare Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) 
(ruling that the section 405(h) jurisdictional bar applies irrespective of whether plaintiff 
challenges agency action on evidentiary, rule-related, statutory, constitutional, or other legal 
grounds), with U.S. ex. rel. Body v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 156 F.3d 1098, 
1105 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Medicare rules and regulations clearly would be determinative of 
whether false claims were, in fact, submitted . . . .”); U.S. ex rel. Woodruff v. Haw. Pac. 
Health, No. 05-00521 JMS/LEK, 2007 WL 1500275, at *8 (D. Haw. May 21, 2007) (To 
state an FCA claim, plaintiffs “must allege that Defendants violated a statute, regulation, or 
other law upon which the government conditions payment of Medicare or Medicaid claims.”); 
United States v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 343 F. Supp. 2d 922, 930 (C.D. Cal. 2004) 
(“[W]hether recovery was sought under the FCA or common law remedies, the fact finder must 
interpret Medicare reimbursement regulations to determine the propriety of the provider’s 
claim.”); United States v. Rogers, No. 1:97CV461, 2001 WL 818160, at *25 (E.D. Tenn. 
June 28, 2001) (“To determine whether the defendants submitted false and fraudulent claims . 
. . , this Court must necessarily look to and apply [CMS’s] rules and regulations governing the 
reimbursement of . . . providers.”).  But see United States v. Univ. of Mass. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 
296 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D. Mass. 2003) (Medicare Act precludes court from determining 
regulatory compliance in common law recoupment action), overruled by United States v. 
Lahey Clinic Hosp., Inc., 399 F.3d 1, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 85. The argument rests on the third sentence of § 405(h) which, as codified, appears to 
apply only to proscribe an “action against the [U.S.] . . . to recover on [a] claim.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 405(h) (2000).  The viability of that limitation is subject to doubt.  See, e.g., Bodimetric 
Health Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 903 F.2d 480, 488, 489 (7th Cir. 1990) (Section 
405(h), as originally adopted, precluded jurisdiction under virtually “all of the grants of 
jurisdiction to the [U.S.] district courts under Title 28”; changes limiting the scope of section 
405(h)’s third sentence were not authorized by Congress); see also Ganem v. Heckler, 746 
F.2d 844, 850-52 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
  Moreover, the second sentence of § 405(h) is comprehensive:  “No findings of fact or 
decision of the [Secretary] shall be reviewed . . . except as herein provided.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 405(h).  Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 757-59 (1975) held that the sentence 
“prevent[s] review of decisions of the Secretary save as provided in the [Social Security] Act” 
and that “[e]ven if the denial is nonfinal, it is still a ‘decision of the Secretary’ which, by virtue 
of the second sentence of [section] 405(h), may not be reviewed” except as provided in the 
Act. 
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decided by the Secretary and subject to judicial review, if at all, solely based 
on the record compiled before the Secretary; and (2) that a claim for 
payment under the Medicare Act cannot be false or fraudulent unless it is 
made in violation of the Act or its implementing regulations.86  Moreover, 
 
 86. In Illinois Council on Long Term Care, the Supreme Court explained that the 
circumstances in which a claim arose under the Medicare Act were extremely broad: 
Those cases [i.e., Salfi and Ringer] themselves foreclose distinctions based upon the 
“potential future” versus the “actual present” nature of the claim, the “general legal” 
versus the “fact-specific” nature of the challenge, the “collateral” versus “non-
collateral” nature of the issues, or the “declaratory” versus “injunctive” nature of the 
relief sought.  Nor can we accept a distinction that limits the scope of § 405(h) to 
claims for monetary benefits.  Claims for money, claims for other benefits, claims of 
program eligibility, and claims that contest a sanction or remedy may all similarly rest 
upon individual fact-related circumstances, may all similarly dispute agency policy 
determinations, or may all similarly involve the application, interpretation, or 
constitutionality of interrelated regulations or statutory provisions.  There is no reason 
to distinguish among them in terms of the language or in terms of the purposes of 
§ 405(h).  Section 1395ii’s blanket incorporation of that provision into the Medicare 
Act as a whole certainly contains no such distinction. 
529 U.S. at 13-14. 
  Tested by this standard, FCA causes of action that require judicial determination of 
the defendant’s compliance with Medicare regulations as the predicate for establishing that a 
claim is false or fraudulent appear to arise under the Act.  The substantive basis of the 
government’s claim is the allegation that the claims at issue sought payment in violation of the 
Medicare Act and its regulations.  Id.  The government’s injury, i.e., the basis for standing, is 
that the Medicare program was duped into paying ineligible claims.  The relief sought is 
measured by the amount of Medicare benefits alleged to have been wrongly paid and the 
number of claims submitted to obtain such payments.  At bottom, such a dispute is about 
entitlement to payment of Medicare benefits.  The FCA in such case would seem best 
understood as playing a role similar to the role served by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (creating 
a civil action for deprivation of rights):  it creates a cause of action, but the substantive basis 
for the claim and for the standing to assert it must be found elsewhere.  See, e.g., Chapman 
v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-19 (1979) (stating that “one cannot go 
into court and claim a ‘violation of § 1983’—for § 1983 by itself does not protect anyone 
against anything”). 
  Undoubtedly the government, or a qui tam plaintiff, would argue that such a case 
arises under the FCA, not the Medicare Act.  See, e.g., Body, 156 F.3d at 1102, 1105-10; 
Tenet Healthcare Corp., 343 F. Supp. 2d at 928 (“[B]ecause the government’s action is 
predicated on the submission of inaccurate . . . claims, the common law, not the Medicare 
Act, provides both standing and the substantive basis for the claim.”); Rogers, 2001 WL 
818160, at *24 (“[T]he federal government’s standing to bring this action and the substantive 
basis for its claims are the FCA and common law, not the Medicare Act.”).  The Supreme 
Court, it appears, might disagree. 
  In Heckler v. Ringer, the plaintiff asked the court to determine whether a particular 
service was reimbursable but predicated his action on the Administrative Procedure Act and 
the Constitution.  The court held: 
Ringer’s claim may well “aris[e] under” the APA [Administrative Procedure Act] in the 
same sense that Salfi’s claim arose under the Constitution, but we held in Salfi that the 
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such an argument rests on a proposition—that the federal government may 
have better access to the courts than citizens—that, at least facially, seems 
antithetical to foundational constitutional principles. 
The congressional policy embodied in Section 405(h) is grounded on, 
among other things, the desire to ensure that the Secretary’s discretion and 
expertise can be applied to the technical and complex questions that arise 
under the Medicare Act.87  Thus, even if Section 405(h) does not, by its 
 
constitutional claim was nonetheless barred by § 405(h).  It would be anomalous 
indeed for this Court to breathe life into the dissent’s already discredited statutory 
argument in order to give greater solicitude to an APA claim than the Court thought 
the statute allowed it to give to the constitutional claim in Salfi. 
466 U.S. 602, 622 (1984); see also Ill. Council on Long Term Care, 529 U.S. at 51-52 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (An action predicated on the Constitution and the APA arises under 
the Medicare Act even where payment of benefits is not sought.  There is no reason to 
suppose that an FCA claim should fare differently.). 
  Ringer makes clear that claims requiring interpretation and application of the 
provisions of the Medicare Act arise under the Act without regard to whether the Medicare 
claim is inextricably intertwined with the federal RICO statute, with the APA, with the Federal 
Tort Claims Act, with the common law, whether the plaintiff seeks only a temporary injunction 
to preserve the status quo, or whether the claim is asserted as a defense to a government 
recoupment action.  Am. Acad. of Dermatology v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 118 F.3d 
1495, 1498 (11th Cir. 1997) (section 405(g) is exclusive means of challenging blanket 
preclusion of payment); St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr. v. United States, 32 F.3d 548, 550 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) (Medicare Act unequivocally provides that no action not specifically authorized by the 
Act shall be brought in any forum, Tucker Act jurisdiction precluded); Livingston Care Ctr., Inc. 
v. United States, 934 F.2d 719, 721 (6th Cir. 1991) (Damages claims arise under Medicare 
Act; no federal question or Federal Tort Claims Act jurisdiction); Bodimetric Health Servs., Inc. 
v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 706 F. Supp. 619, 626 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff’d. 903 F.2d 480 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (no jurisdiction over RICO and state law tort claims); V.N.A. of Greater Tift County, 
Inc. v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 1020, 1024-25 (11th Cir. 1983) (no jurisdiction to issue status quo 
injunction pending completion of administrative process); United States v. Sanet, 666 F.2d 
1370, 1375 (11th Cir. 1982) (no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (2000) to determine 
entitlement to Medicare payment); United States v. Royal Geropsychiatric Servs., Inc., 8 F. 
Supp. 2d 690 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (same). But see United States v. Carpentieri, 23 F. Supp. 2d 
433, 437-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (need for agency determination does not preclude FCA case); 
U.S. ex rel. Aranda v. Cmty. Psychiatric Ctrs. of Okla., Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D. Okla. 
1996). 
  If the claim for payment at issue in the FCA action was made under the Medicare Act 
and if the claim can only be false or fraudulent under the Medicare Act, it would seem to arise 
under the Medicare Act.  There would be no false claim without the Medicare Act. 
 87. The Supreme Court has explained:  “Insofar as § 405(h) . . . demands the 
‘channeling’ of virtually all legal attacks through the agency, it assures the agency greater 
opportunity to apply, interpret, or revise policies, regulations, or statutes without possibly 
premature interference by different individual courts . . . .”  Ill. Council on Long Term Care, 
529 U.S. at 13; see also Ringer, 466 U.S. at 617; V.N.A. of Greater Tift County, Inc., 711 
F.2d at 1035 (“The situation of disputed application of a regulation to complex and lengthy 
facts is particularly suited to initial agency interpretation of its own regulations.”). 
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terms, preclude jurisdiction in an FCA case, the oft recognized, and strongly 
stated, congressional policy ought to be entitled to considerable weight.88  
The judicial determination of compliance with regulatory standards that is 
necessary to determine if a claim is false or fraudulent under the FCA has 
no less potential to interfere with the Secretary’s discretion than a judicial 
determination of entitlement to Medicare payment in the first instance.89 
 
 88. Sections 405(g) and (h) are found in Title II of the Social Security Act and are 
applicable to a number of Social Security Act programs.  Sections 405(g) and (h) are 
incorporated by reference into the Medicare Act.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ii, 1395w-22(5) 
(2000).  In addition, the Medicare Act itself repeatedly stresses that determination of the 
applicability of the Act’s provisions is for the Secretary alone.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395kk(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter [xviii], . . . the insurance 
programs established by this subchapter shall be administered by the Secretary.”); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395ff(a)(1) (“The initial determination of whether an individual is entitled to benefits under 
[the Medicare Act], [and] [t]he initial determination of the amount of benefits” shall be made 
by the Secretary in accordance with regulations he prescribes.).  Cf. New York v. Sec'y of 
Health and Human Servs., 903 F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1990) (“The Medicare statute 
unambiguously vests final authority in the Secretary, and no one else, to determine . . . 
whether reimbursement should be made.”). 
 89. Insofar as the author is aware, there are few cases addressing whether an FCA case, 
based on the Medicare Act, is subject to Section 405’s jurisdictional limitations.  Body, 156 
F.3d at 1101, was the first case to do so.  See also Ringer, 466 U.S. at 602; Salfi, 422 U.S. 
at 749. 
  In Body, a qui tam relator claimed that Blue Cross paid Medicare reimbursement to 
Alabama hospitals for unallowable costs.  The district court, relying on Bodimetric Health 
Servs., Inc., 903 F.2d at 480, dismissed the complaint holding that Section 405(h) precluded 
jurisdiction.  U.S. ex rel. Body v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., No. CV93-P-1508-
S, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22432, at *5-9 (N.D. Ala. April 28, 1995). 
  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal on other grounds, but found that Section 
405 did not preclude federal question jurisdiction.  Acknowledging that the Supreme Court 
has read Section 405 very broadly, the Body Court, nonetheless, held that “[a]ctions such as 
Body’s, which do not seek payment from the government and could not be brought under 
Section 405, are therefore not barred by subsection 405(h).”  Body, 156 F.3d at 1104.  The 
Body court summarized: 
We rely today on . . . the distinction between a case brought by a beneficiary, who 
ultimately wants funds from the government and may challenge adverse decisions 
through the administrative process, and a case brought by a qui tam relator under the 
[FCA], who seeks to recover money erroneously paid by the government, a claim not 
cognizable in the administrative scheme. 
Id. at 1109.  The decision in Body predates the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois Council 
on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1.  Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., explicitly 
rejected the distinction relied on by the Eleventh Circuit, explaining that whether a claim 
“arises under” the Medicare Act is not premised on whether the plaintiff is or is not a 
beneficiary seeking benefits under the Act, or upon whether the plaintiff would have been 
entitled to an administrative hearing.  Any “action” that “dispute[s] agency policy 
determinations, or may . . . similarly involve the application, interpretation, or constitutionality 
of interrelated regulations or statutory provisions,” arises under the Medicare Act and federal 
court jurisdiction is precluded under Section 405 unless the claim has been “channeled 
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2. Courts Often Have Precluded Judicial Determination of Issues 
Committed to Agency Discretion Even When the Seminal Statute Did 
Not Expressly Bar Jurisdiction 
In cases not involving the FCA, the Supreme Court has held that the 
existence of detailed and comprehensive regulatory and enforcement 
schemes indicates congressional intent to preclude enforcement of the 
statute by anyone other than the agency to whom Congress has delegated 
enforcement discretion.90  More specifically, where a statute commits to an 
administrative agency the power to make a finding that is the necessary 
predicate for judicial action, the Court long has held that the judiciary lacks 
jurisdiction to act.91 
In Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., for 
example, plaintiff claimed common law fraud and alleged a federal 
statutory right to a reasonable utility rate and a common law right not to 
have the rate influenced by interlocking directorates.92  The Supreme Court 
held that the only rate plaintiff was entitled to was one determined by the 
Federal Power Commission: 
A court may think a different level more reasonable.  But the prescription of 
the statute is a standard for the Commission to apply and, independently of 
Commission action, creates no right which courts may enforce. 
 
through the agency.”  529 U.S. at 4, 14.  A related issue appears to have been raised, but 
not decided, in Ohio Hosp. Ass'n v. Shalala, 201 F.3d 418 (6th Cir. 1999).  But see Tenet 
Healthcare Corp., 343 F. Supp. 2d at 931 (acknowledging that whether a claim is false 
depends on court interpretation and application of Medicare regulation to facts, but saying 
“nothing in Illinois Council contradicts the Body court’s conclusion that subsection 405(h) . . . 
is . . . inapplicable to claims brought on behalf of the government to recover overpayments”) 
(internal quotation omitted). 
 90. See, e.g., Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997) (“[D]ismissal is proper if 
Congress . . . impliedly [foreclosed a remedy] by creating a comprehensive enforcement 
scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement. . . .”); Touche Ross & Co. v. 
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579 (1979) (“[I]f Congress intends those customers to have such a 
federal right of action, it is well aware of how it may effectuate that intent.”); Nat’l R.R. 
Passenger Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (“A frequently 
stated principle of statutory construction is that when legislation expressly provides a particular 
remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume other 
remedies.”). 
 91. See, e.g., Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251-53 
(1951), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 97-100.  Cf. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 343 
F. Supp. 2d at 930-31; Rogers, 2001 WL 818160, at *20 (When CMS, on referral from the 
court, refuses to make a regulatory compliance determination on a regulatory compliance 
question that determines whether a claim is “false” under the FCA, “[c]ourts can and should 
proceed to exercise . . . jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue.”). 
 92. See generally Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 341 U.S. 246. 
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  Petitioner cannot separate what Congress has joined together.  It cannot 
litigate in a judicial forum its general right to a reasonable rate, ignoring the 
qualification that it shall be made specific only by exercise of the 
Commission’s judgment, in which there is some considerable element of 
discretion.93 
Noting that Congress had given the Commission discretion to approve 
otherwise illegal interlocking directorates, the Court dismissed a common 
law fraud claim based on an interlocking directorate: 
The effect of the approval is to exempt the relationship from the ban of the 
Act and remove from it any presumption of fraud that might be thought to 
arise from its mere existence.  It would be a strange contradiction between 
judicial and administrative policies if a relationship which the Commission 
has declared will not adversely affect public or private interests were 
regarded by courts as enough to create a presumption of fraud.  Perhaps, in 
the absence of the Commission’s approval, such relationship would be 
sufficient to raise the presumption under state law, but it cannot do so where 
the federal supervising authority has expressly approved the arrangement.94 
Allegations that a claim is false or fraudulent under the FCA because a 
government contractor failed to comply with regulatory standards would 
seem analogous.  In such a case, as in Montana-Dakota, a court may think 
that the contractor violated the regulations and, therefore, was not entitled 
to payment “[b]ut the prescription of the statute is a standard for the 
[Secretary] to apply.”95  Similarly, a plaintiff “cannot litigate in a judicial 
forum its general right” to pay only for reasonable services, “ignoring the 
qualification that it shall be made specific only by exercise of the 
[Secretary’s] judgment, in which there is some considerable element of 
discretion.”96 
 
 93. Id. at 251. 
 94. Id. at 252-53 (emphasis added); see also Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 
200 (1994) (no jurisdiction under Federal Mine Safety and Health Act because designation of 
miners’ representatives committed to Mine Safety and Health Administration); Ark. La. Gas 
Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571 (1981) (filed rate doctrine bars jurisdiction over claims under 
Natural Gas Act); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. MacKenzie, 303 U.S. 41 (1938) 
(district courts have no jurisdiction over claim arising under National Labor Relations Act 
because National Labor Relations Board and Circuit Court of Appeals have exclusive initial 
jurisdiction over unfair labor practices); McHugh v. Rubin, 220 F.3d 53, 61 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(citing Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1 (2000)) (no jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2000) or 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2000) where ATF had not rendered 
administrative “denial” of application); H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 
1992) (filed rate doctrine barred RICO action); U.S. ex rel. Windsor v. DynCorp, Inc., 895 F. 
Supp. 844 (E.D. Va. 1995) (Davis-Bacon Act precluded jurisdiction over FCA case). 
 95. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 341 U.S. at 251. 
 96. Id. 
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Further, many statutes, including several provisions of the Medicare Act, 
give the agency power to waive a contractor’s liability or continue payment 
in certain circumstances, despite apparent noncompliance with regulatory 
standards.97  Again paralleling Montana-Dakota, “the effect of the 
[agency’s] approval” of payment, notwithstanding the supplies being 
deemed unnecessary, would be to “remove from [the claim] any 
presumption of fraud.”98 
Yet, the strange contradiction between judicial and administrative 
policies denounced by Montana-Dakota arises in many cases.  Indeed, FCA 
and qui tam cases like Hendow often are brought in circumstances in which 
an agency has elected to impose no remedy or an alternate remedy, rather 
than seek recovery of payments made for services rendered when a 
contractor allegedly was in violation of regulatory standards.99 
The need to avoid the strange contradiction has led courts, in a variety 
of contexts, to refuse to allow FCA actions to proceed where resolution of 
whether the claim was false or fraudulent would require the court to decide 
a matter committed to the discretion of an administrative agency.  In United 
States ex rel. Windsor v. DynCorp, Inc., for example, the gravamen of the 
plaintiff’s FCA claim was that the defendant submitted false claims because 
it misclassified workers and the wages paid to them in violation of the Davis-
Bacon Act.100  In dismissing plaintiff’s claim, the court stated that it was 
 
 97. See, e.g., United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 288 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 2002), 
rev’d, 326 F.3d 669 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (HUD continued payment despite 
noncompliance); U.S. ex rel. Swan v. Covenant Care, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1222 
(E.D. Cal. 2002) (“HHS may also exercise discretion not to impose sanctions in a particular 
case.”); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant at 9 n.3, U.S. ex 
rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2005) (No. 05-2016), 2005 WL 
3950531 (citing DOE Memorandum, supra note 14 (saying that the DOE reversed its policy 
of treating violation as “monetary loss to the Department;” instead, it treats such violations as 
compliance matters)). 
 98. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 341 U.S. at 252. 
 99. See cases cited infra note 133.  In fact, in at least one instance, the government has 
brought an FCA case claiming that a Medicare provider billed for medical supplies that could 
never be eligible for Medicare reimbursement despite the rulings of numerous Medicare 
Administrative Law Judges in essentially identical circumstances determining that the supplies 
were reasonable and necessary and, therefore, ordering Medicare to pay for them.  See 
United States v. Gericare Med. Supply Inc., No. CIV.A.99-0366-CB-L, 2000 WL 33156443, 
at *1 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 11, 2000) (The author was counsel to defendants in the case and he has 
copies of the pleadings on file.).  The case was settled based on a cash payment by the 
defendants in roughly the amount that Medicare had paid them for the supplies that had been 
used to deliver patient care.  The case is typical of FCA actions in which the magnitude of 
potential damages and penalties under the FCA makes even a minimal risk of such an award 
an unacceptable risk. 
 100. 895 F. Supp. 844, 849 (E.D. Va. 1995). 
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impossible to determine whether DynCorp submitted a false claim to the 
government without first determining whether DynCorp actually misclassified 
an employee in a given instance.  And, the responsibility for resolving such 
disputes rests not with the courts, but with the Department of Labor . . . . 
  . . . . 
  . . . To permit Windsor’s claim to go to a jury would result in bypassing 
the carefully crafted administrative scheme for resolving Davis-Bacon Act 
classification disputes.  Contrary to this scheme, a jury, not the agency, 
would listen to testimony of employees regarding the work they performed 
on various dates and then determine the appropriate classification for any 
given task by reference to the Department of Labor’s complex classification 
standards.101 
This principle would seem especially compelling when a court is required to 
apply Medicare regulations to determine the falsity of a claim under the FCA 
inasmuch as courts frequently have held that the discretionary compliance 
determinations required by the Act are “peculiarly within the Secretary’s 
competence.”102 
Further, judicial restraint would seem appropriate when courts are asked 
to interpret and apply administrative regulations in an FCA action because 
the processes and rules used by administrative agencies to make 
discretionary decisions are unlike those used by courts.  In the context of the 
Social Security Act, such differences led the Supreme Court to comment that 
“[t]he differences between courts and agencies are nowhere more 
pronounced than in Social Security proceedings.”103  There is, however, a 
discomfiting split in the courts with respect to judicial authority to interpret 
and apply Medicare law to the facts of an FCA or common law fraud case, 
despite the fact that all courts recognize that the court’s interpretation of 
Medicare law necessarily determines whether a claim is false or 
fraudulent.104 
 
 101. Id. at 851-52; see also U.S. ex rel. Lamers v. City of Green Bay, 168 F.3d 1013, 
1020 (7th Cir. 1999) (FCA cannot be used “to preempt the [agency’s] discretionary decision 
not to pursue regulatory penalties.”); United States v. Dan Caputo Co., 152 F.3d 1060 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (permitting jury in FCA case to decide key issue circumvents administrative 
scheme); U.S. ex rel. Local Union No. 217 v. G.E. Chen Constr., Inc., 954 F. Supp. 195 
(N.D. Cal. 1997) (FCA case dismissed because predicate determination committed to DOL). 
 102. See, e.g., Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 618 (1984); New York v. Sec'y of Health 
and Human Servs., 903 F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1990) (“The Medicare statute unambiguously 
vests final authority in the Secretary, and no one else, to determine” application of Medicare 
regulations.). 
 103. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110 (2000). 
 104. Compare U.S. ex rel. Sweeney v. Manorcare Health Servs., Inc., No. C03-5320RJB, 
2005 WL 4030950 (W.D. Wash. March 4, 2005); United States v. Univ. of Mass. Mem'l 
Med. Ctr., 296 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D. Mass. 2003); and U.S. ex rel. Swan v. Covenant Care, 
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Differences between judicial and administrative processes have caused 
courts in non-FCA contexts to routinely decline to substitute judicial for 
administrative processes.  In V.N.A. of Greater Tift County, Inc. v. 
Heckler,105 for example, the plaintiff, claiming that recoupment of alleged 
Medicare overpayments by the Secretary would result in bankruptcy, sought 
an injunction precluding the Secretary from recouping money until after a 
final decision was rendered in his administrative appeal.106  The Eleventh 
Circuit emphasized that “[w]here both parties engage in extensive discovery” 
and the court thereafter determines compliance with Medicare regulations in 
a fact-finding hearing, the “court does exactly what the [agency]” alone is 
authorized to do.107  According to the Eleventh Circuit, “[s]uch plenary 
consideration violates not only the procedural structure of the Medicare Act, 
but it is in effect a de novo decision on the merits in direct contravention of 
the limited review mandated by statute.”108  Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit 
explained, “[t]he situation of disputed application of a regulation to complex 
and lengthy facts is particularly suited to initial agency interpretation of its 
own regulations.”109 
3. The Tension Between the FCA and Modern Administrative 
Regulatory Programs: Who Should Decide? 
If the FCA creates an exception to statutory and general jurisdictional 
limitations and allows courts to determine compliance with agency 
regulations in order to decide if a claim is false or fraudulent, such 
exception ought to be announced and its relationship to complex 
administrative regulatory and enforcement programs rationally explained in 
light of the FCA’s history, not presumed sub silentio, as has generally been 
the case to date.  In addition, if special rules are to be applied to FCA 
actions involving the Medicare Act, as some courts have suggested, the 
rationale for such differential treatment also should be explained.110 
 
Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (E.D. Cal. 2002), with United States v. Lahey Clinic Hosp., Inc., 
399 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005); U.S. ex rel. Body v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 156 
F.3d 1098 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 343 F. Supp. 2d 922 
(C.D. Cal. 2004); and United States v. Rogers, No. 1:97CV461, 2001 WL 818160 (E.D. 
Tenn. June 28, 2001) (CMS refrains from administrative determination and requests court to 
interpret Medicare rules in the first instance). 
 105. 711 F.2d 1020 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 106. Id. at 1022. 
 107. Id. at 1032. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1035. 
 110. See U.S. ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1177 (9th Cir. 2006), 
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2099 (2007) (distinguishing U.S. ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 
687 (2d Cir. 2001) as “specifically confined” to Medicare claims); U.S. ex rel. Woodruff v. 
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(a) United States ex rel. Hendow v. University of Phoenix or “Who Cares 
What the DOE Thinks?” 
The Hendow case illustrates the need to reconcile the FCA and modern 
administrative regulatory programs.  The plaintiffs, private individuals, 
brought a qui tam action under the FCA alleging that the UOP, a 
proprietary university that contracts with the DOE, falsely claimed 
compliance with program requirements in order to obtain a supplier 
contract with the DOE.111  However, rather than treat the violation as fraud, 
the DOE, consistent with its published policy,112 made a discretionary 
decision to continue making payments to UOP.113  Also consistent with its 
published policy, the DOE elected to treat the university’s alleged violation 
of the ban on incentive compensation as a regulatory enforcement 
matter.114  UOP was required to pay a fine, but the settlement “did not 
require UOP to repay any of the financial aid received by its students, 
change any of its practices for compensating admissions counselors, or 
discipline any of its employees.”115 
The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs had stated an FCA claim.116  
Summarily dismissing the DOE’s enforcement authority and its power to 
withhold funds and impose sanctions as “largely academic,” the court held 
that federal payments and eligibility to participate as a provider were 
inextricably intertwined.117  Consequently, the court concluded that 
compliance with the statutory and regulatory provisions at issue was a 
precondition to federal payment.118 
Rejecting UOP’s argument that the requirement was “merely a condition 
of participation, not a condition of payment” as resting on a distinction 
without a difference, the Ninth Circuit effectively overrode, but did not 
overrule, its earlier decision in United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton.119  
 
Haw. Pac. Health, No. 05-00521 JMS/LEK, 2007 WL 1500275, at *5-8 (D. Haw. May 21, 
2007) (distinguishing Hendow as applying to the DOE program, not to Medicare). 
 111. Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1169. 
 112. Id. at 1168-69. 
 113. Id. at 1169-70. 
 114. Id. at 1170. 
 115. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Hendow, 127 S. Ct. 2099 (2007) (No. 06-1006), 
2007 WL 160712. 
 116. Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1177. 
 117. Id. at 1175. 
 118. Id. at 1175-76. 
 119. Id. at 1176.  In U.S. ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 1996), the 
plaintiff alleged that violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Act supported an FCA action.  
The Ninth Circuit held that the availability of “administrative and other remedies for regulatory 
violations” demonstrated that compliance with the regulations “was not a sine qua non of 
receipt of state funding.”  Id. at 1267.  Therefore, an FCA action would not lie. 
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Further, after attempting to distinguish the leading Second Circuit case from 
which the “participation versus payment” distinction originated, United 
States ex rel. Mikes v. Strauss,120 the court dismissed the Second Circuit’s 
holding as confined to the Medicare context.121 
The court’s treatment of its Anton ruling, which it characterized as “[t]he 
leading case on false certification in the Ninth Circuit,”122 its dismissal of 
Mikes and its mechanistic application of the FCA to claims made under a 
complex and detailed statute, reflect the deep-seated tension inherent in 
applying the terms “false or fraudulent” to types of payment claims never 
contemplated by the FCA’s authors.  Even more pertinent, the court never 
considered whether the menu of administrative remedies for noncompliance 
that Congress made available to the DOE (other than recoupment of past 
payments) indicated that compliance was not a precondition to payment.  
Similarly, nowhere in Hendow does the court acknowledge that the DOE 
was aware of the noncompliance and, nevertheless, continued paying UOP.  
Likewise, the court never mentions that the DOE issued a written policy 
providing that, because the violation caused the government no monetary 
loss, the violation should be treated, not as fraud, but as a matter for 
administrative penalties.123  To put the matter bluntly, although the court 
characterized the requirement that UOP allegedly violated as “a 
‘prerequisite’ to funding,”124 the DOE, the agency that Congress authorized 
to run the program, had determined, as a matter of policy and, specifically, 
in the case of UOP, that the requirement was not a material precondition or 
a “sine qua non of receipt of [government] funding” and that the agency 
had gotten what it paid for, suffering no monetary loss.125 
Although the Hendow court refused to accord the DOE’s enforcement 
authority any weight, other courts, including the Ninth Circuit in Anton, have 
found that the availability of a menu of administrative sanctions 
demonstrates that regulatory compliance is not a precondition to payment 
and, therefore, that noncompliance does not render a claim false or 
fraudulent.126  Other courts addressing a point ignored by the Hendow court 
 
 120. 274 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 121. Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1177. 
 122. Id. at 1171. 
 123. See DOE Memorandum, supra note 14. 
 124. Id. at 1176. 
 125. Id. at 1172 (quoting Anton, 91 F.3d at 1267). 
 126. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex. Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 
382-83 (5th Cir. 2003) (Compliance with regulations clearly not condition of payment 
because statute authorizes government only to apply remedies prospectively); U.S. ex rel. 
Cooper v. Gentiva Health Servs., Inc., No. 01-508, 2003 WL 22495607, at *7-9 (W.D. Pa. 
Nov. 4, 2003) (same); U.S. ex rel. Ortega v. Columbia Healthcare, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 8, 
19 (D.D.C. 2003) (Remedies under the FCA only apply “if compliance with the statutes or 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
158 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:131 
also have refused to allow an FCA action based on regulatory 
noncompliance because imposition of the only remedies provided by the 
FCA—multiple damages and large per claim penalties—would 
impermissibly supplant the remedial discretion that Congress conferred on 
the agency.127  Thus, courts have refused to allow FCA cases based on 
regulatory noncompliance because doing so would effectively “preempt” the 
remedial decision made by the enforcement agency,128 and “would allow 
courts to take away all money a hospital received from Medicare even 
though the agencies charged with the enforcement of Medicare statutes and 
regulations would not have done so.”129 
The need to reconcile the use of the FCA to the comprehensive 
regulatory and enforcement programs run by the modern administrative 
state also is illustrated by comparing Hendow’s reading of Anton with other 
courts’ analyses of the Anton ruling.  Many courts have dismissed FCA 
claims, citing Anton for the proposition that an FCA action based on 
regulatory violations impermissibly interferes with an agency’s remedial 
discretion.130  Yet, to a significant extent, the Hendow court also predicates 
its ruling, permitting an FCA action based on regulatory noncompliance to 
proceed, on Anton.131 
(b) The FCA and the Medicare Program: A Match Not Made in Heaven 
Nowhere has the tension between the FCA and the modern 
administrative state been more prevalent—and more in need of resolution—
than in the context of government-funded healthcare benefit programs, such 
 
regulations was a prerequisite to gaining a benefit, and the defendant affirmatively certified 
such compliance.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 127. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 459 F. Supp. 2d 
1081, 1088 (D. Kan. 2006) (finding that Congress did not intend “for the FCA to apply to the 
types of claims” at issue in the case); U.S. ex rel. Sweeney v. Manorcare Health Servs., Inc., 
No. C03-5320RJB, 2005 WL 4030950, at *6-7 (W.D. Wash. March 4, 2005) (allowing qui 
tam plaintiffs to proceed on FCA claims where HHS has chosen to waive remedies allows 
“plaintiffs to supplant the regulatory discretion granted to HHS”); U.S. ex rel. Swan v. 
Covenant Care, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1222-23 (E.D. Cal. 2002). 
 128. U.S. ex rel. Lamers v. City of Green Bay, 168 F.3d 1013, 1020 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 129. Conner, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 1088. 
 130. See cases discussed supra note 127. 
 131. 461 F.3d at 1171-73.  Moreover, unlike Hendow, most of the cases relying on Anton 
to dismiss FCA claims based on regulatory noncompliance involved alleged violations that the 
agency had not yet addressed.  Hendow is not unique; it is merely the latest example of the 
disconnect between the FCA and the administrative state.  Cf. U.S. ex rel. Woodruff v. Haw. 
Pac. Health, No. 05-00521 JMS/LEK, 2007 WL 1500275, at *6-8 (D. Haw. May 21, 2007) 
(discussing Hendow and denying defendants’ motion to dismiss an FCA claim that they had 
submitted facially false claims to Medicaid). 
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as the Medicare and Medicaid programs.132  The importance of directly 
addressing and resolving the tension is exacerbated because the federal 
government is the largest single purchaser of healthcare in the United 
States.133  In 2006, the Medicare and Medicaid programs accounted for 
approximately 21% of all federal spending.134 
Medicare and Medicaid benefits generally are provided through private 
contractors (known as providers) who are paid pursuant to the Medicare 
and Medicaid statutes and accompanying regulations.135  These statutes 
and regulations have been described by the Supreme Court as “Byzantine” 
texts that are “among the most intricate ever drafted by Congress.”136  
Healthcare providers daily navigate a “morass of bureaucratic complexity,” 
submitting thousands of claims a day to the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs.137  If providers cross one of the lines in these programs’ 
“impenetrable texts,”138 they expose themselves to potential liability under 
the FCA for treble damages and penalties of $5,500-$11,000 for every 
false or fraudulent claim knowingly presented to the government.139 
(i) The Long Term Care Survey and Enforcement Process and the 
Judicial Process: The Differences Could Not Be More Profound 
The tension between the nursing home regulatory system established by 
Congress and enforced by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, on 
the one hand, and the use of the FCA to recover treble damages and 
 
 132. This is evident from, among other things, the number of healthcare based FCA 
actions.  In 2006, of all FCA actions filed, 28% involved matters in which HHS was the 
primary agency.  More FCA cases involve HHS than the Department of Defense.  THE FALSE 
CLAIMS ACT LEGAL CENTER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: FRAUD STATISTICS - OVERVIEW (Oct. 1, 
1986 – Sept. 30, 2006), available at www.taf.org/stats-fy2006.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 
2008). 
 133. See Waste, Fraud, Abuse, and Mismanagement: Hearing Before the Task Force on 
Health of the H. Budget Comm., 106th Cong. 178 (2000) (Statement of Office of Inspector 
Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/ 
cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_house_hearings&docid=f:64510.pdf (describing the 
Health Care Financing Administration (now CMS) as the largest health care purchaser in the 
world) (last visited Jan. 31, 2008). 
 134. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2008 TO 
2017, at 54 (Jan. 2007) (also noting that federal Medicare and Medicaid spending totaled 
$554 billion in 2006). 
 135. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395g, (2000). 
 136. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981); see also Shalala v. Ill. Council 
on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (describing Medicare as a “massive, 
complex health and safety program . . . embodied in hundreds of pages of statutes and 
thousands of pages of often interrelated regulations”). 
 137. See Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 279 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 138. Rehab. Ass’n of Va., Inc. v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1450 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 139. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2000); 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(9) (2007). 
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penalties for claims that are allegedly false or fraudulent because a nursing 
home provider has violated one or more eligibility standards arises from: 
(1) the differing processes used by the Secretary and the courts to determine 
the existence of a regulatory violation; and (2) the extent of the discretion 
committed by law to the Secretary to craft a response to any regulatory 
violation and the range of possible responses, including continued payment 
for services notwithstanding the existence of a regulatory violation. 
For example, the Medicare and Medicaid Acts require administrative 
determinations of nursing facility compliance to be made in a manner 
specified by the Acts that is entirely unlike—indeed, the antithesis of—the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of Evidence that a court would 
use to determine whether a payment claim is false or fraudulent under the 
FCA.140  Determinations of compliance must be made by an on-site 
inspection using forms, procedures, and protocols that bear no relation to 
the judicial fact-finding process.141  The survey forms, procedures, 
guidelines, and methodologies must have been “develop[ed], test[ed], or 
validate[d]” by the Secretary.142  According to the statute, the compliance 
determination must be made by a “multidisciplinary team of professionals,” 
including at least one registered nurse.143 
In further contrast to the judicial process, surveyors must use “a case-mix 
stratified sample of residents” to evaluate “the quality of care furnished, as 
measured by indicators of medical, nursing, and rehabilitative care, dietary 
and nutrition services, activities and social participation, and sanitation, 
infection control, and physical environment.”144  Surveyors are to “directly 
observe the actual provision of care and services to residents, and the 
effects of that care, to assess whether the care provided meets the needs of 
individual residents.”145  Failure to utilize the prescribed protocol renders the 
results of the inspection invalid.146 
If the team of inspectors, called surveyors, determines that the nursing 
home is in substantial (i.e., not perfect) compliance with the regulations 
 
 140. See generally Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 223 F. Supp. 2d 73 
(D.D.C. 2002) (discussing the process the agency took to determine whether a nursing facility 
was in compliance with the statute and deciding that the process complied with statutory 
requirements). 
 141. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g) (2000). 
 142. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(g)(2)(C), 1396r(g)(2)(C); see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.100-
488.115, 488.300-488.335 (2007).   
 143. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(g)(2)(E)(i), 1396r(g)(2)(E)(i) (2000); see also 42 C.F.R. 
§ 488.314(a) (2007). 
 144. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(g)(2)(A)(ii)(I), 1396r(g)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2000). 
 145. 42 C.F.R. § 488.26(c)(2) (2007). 
 146. See id. § 442.30(a)(5)(ii)-(v) (stating that Medicare and Medicaid provider 
agreements are not valid if federal survey forms and procedures are not used by inspectors). 
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governing participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs, payments 
will continue.147  Even if the nursing home is not in substantial compliance at 
the time of the survey, in most cases, the nursing home will be given an 
opportunity to correct any problems and federal payment may continue for 
months while it does so.148 
In addition, if a nursing facility is noncompliant, the Secretary has 
discretion to impose a variety of remedies.149  Some of the remedies that 
may be imposed include termination of a provider’s prospective ability to 
participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs, denial of payments to 
the provider, placement of a temporary manager or state monitor in the 
facility, and civil money penalties up to $10,000 per incident or for each 
day that the violation existed.150 
In order to select an appropriate sanction, deficiencies are classified by 
seriousness.151  Seriousness is assessed by evaluating the severity of the 
deficiency (i.e., the degree of actual and potential harm) in conjunction with 
the scope of the deficiency (i.e., the degree to which it is pervasive or 
isolated).152  The selection of an appropriate administrative remedy involves 
considerable discretion and the Secretary must assess the “most effective 
remedy” to ensure “the protection of the well[-]being of the resident 
population,”153 as well as the facility’s “prior history of noncompliance.”154  
In contrast, the FCA imposes multiple damages and per claim penalties 
whenever a claim is false or fraudulent without regard to the scope or 
severity of the underlying regulatory violation or the impact on those served 
by the regulatory program.155 
 
 147. See generally id. §§ 488.26(b) (“The decision as to whether there is compliance . . . 
depends upon the manner and degree to which the provider . . . satisfies the various 
standards within each condition.”), 488.301 (defining “[s]ubstantial compliance” as 
compliance such that “any identified deficiencies pose no greater risk to resident health or 
safety than the potential for causing minimal harm.”). 
 148. See, e.g., Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 223 F. Supp. 2d 73, 
110 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[I]t is unusual, if not unique” to terminate facility participation in the 
absence of immediate jeopardy to patients.). 
 149. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(h) (2000). 
 150. See id. §§ 1395i-3(h)(2), 1396r(h)(2). 
 151. See 42 C.F.R. § 488.404(b) (2007). 
 152. Id. §§ 488.404(b), 488.410(a); see also id. §§ 488.404, 488.406 (listing available 
remedies). 
 153. Survey, Certification and Enforcement of Skilled Nursing Facilities and Nursing 
Facilities, 59 Fed. Reg. 56,116, 56,123 (Nov. 10, 1994). 
 154. 42 C.F.R. § 488.404(c)(2). 
 155. Hendow, 461 F.3d 1166, 1177 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2099 
(2007), is again illustrative.  The policy that the DOE relied on to continue payments to UOP 
despite the violations was based on consideration of the impact of the violation on the student 
beneficiaries of the program and on assessment of the magnitude of harm that the violation 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
162 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:131 
Congress viewed determination of nursing providers’ regulatory 
compliance through use of the survey protocol and inspection methodology 
specified in the Acts and the remedial discretion conferred on the Secretary 
as critical to consistent and effective regulation of the quality of nursing 
facility care.156  Indeed, one of the principal purposes of the comprehensive 
Nursing Home Reform Act passed by Congress in 1987 was to confer 
discretion on the Secretary to continue Medicare and Medicaid payments 
even where nursing facilities had regulatory violations.157 
(ii) Part D and the FCA: Furthering the Disconnect: Administrative 
Enforcement of the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit and the FCA 
The tension between the differing FCA and administrative enforcement 
approaches exists with many Medicare Act programs.  Indeed, the 
disconnect between the FCA and the modern administrative state likely will 
be acute when FCA claims begin to implicate the new Part D prescription 
drug benefit.158 
 
caused the U.S.  See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.  In contrast, the Ninth 
Circuit’s ruling permits imposition of damages and penalties without any consideration of the 
impact such remedy will have on program beneficiaries or otherwise. 
 156. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(g)(3)(C), 1396r(g)(3)(C) (2000). 
 157. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(h)(2)(C), 1396r(h)(3)(C); COMM’N ON NURSING HOME 
REGULATION, INST. OF MED., supra note 32, at 38-39. 
 158. The tension between administrative enforcement and the FCA enforcement of 
regulatory standards will increase as Part D matures.  In the past, for instance, prescription 
drug plans were often the victims of fraud, but now, because of their Part D responsibilities, 
they are just as likely to be viewed as potential perpetrators.  In addition, the volume of 
Medicare claims made under Part D is likely to increase, resulting in more opportunities for 
deliberate or inadvertent violation of program requirements.  Similarly, the Part D reporting 
requirements have grown longer and more detailed every year.  CMS’s Medicare Part D 
Reporting Requirements:  Contract Year 2008 is thirty-three pages long and CMS has 
cautioned that “[a]dditional reporting requirements are identified in separate guidance 
documents throughout the year.”  CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE PART D 
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS: CONTRACT YEAR 2008, at 3 (Feb. 9, 2007), available at 
www.cms.hhs.gov/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/Downloads/PartDReportingRequirements_Next 
Year.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2007).  Moreover, Part D imposes complex accounting 
requirements, including a requirement that prescription rebates and discounts be allocated by 
drug and by beneficiary.  Further, many Part D performance standards were issued as “sub-
regulatory guidance,” i.e., without resort to standard Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
rulemaking procedures.  Even if noncompliance with a regulation adopted through the APA’s 
rulemaking process makes a claim for payment false, it is legitimate to ask whether 
noncompliance with sub-regulatory guidance also can make a claim false. 
  Part D also expands the potential for an FCA action by making the Part D prescription 
plan responsible for the actions of all entities in its network.  For example, the plan is 
responsible for the accuracy of all data it submits to CMS whether it generates the data itself, 
obtains it from third parties who perform plan administration or other functions or whether 
such data is submitted directly to CMS by third parties on behalf of the plan.  Part D likewise 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] THE UBIQUITOUS FALSE CLAIMS ACT 163 
Administrative authority to enforce Part D’s regulatory requirements is 
shared by CMS and the HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG).159  The 
OIG and CMS have independent, but overlapping, authority to impose 
sanctions for violation of Part D requirements.160  OIG may impose 
sanctions in addition to, or instead of, CMS.161 
In provisions likely to mirror future FCA claims, Part D provides that 
sanctions may be imposed when, among other things, a participating 
prescription drug plan: 
 “fails substantially to provide, to a Part D plan enrollee, medically 
necessary services that the organization is required to provide (under 
law or under the contract) . . . , and that failure adversely affects (or 
is substantially likely to adversely affect) the enrollee”;162 
 imposes premiums on enrollees “in excess of the monthly basic and 
supplemental beneficiary premiums permitted” by the law and 
regulations;163 
 “acts to expel or refuses to reenroll a beneficiary in violation of the 
[regulations]”;164 or 
 “misrepresents or falsifies information” that it provides to CMS or 
“[t]o an individual or to any other entity under the Part D drug benefit 
program.”165 
The potential administrative sanctions for such violations include: 
 civil money penalties (CMPs) ranging from $10,000 to $100,000, 
 suspension of enrollment of Medicare beneficiaries, 
 suspension of Medicare payments, 
 suspension of marketing activities, 
 
expands the pool of potential relators.  Qui tam actions today are commonly brought by ex-
employees who, during their employment, had access to the necessary data.  Under Part D, 
however, employees of plan administrators, retailers, manufacturers, and pharmacies all will 
have access to data necessary to support claims for Part D payment.  See generally James G. 
Sheehan & Jesse A. Goldner, Beyond the Anti-Kickback Statute:  New Entities, New Theories 
in Healthcare Fraud Prosecutions, 40 J. HEALTH L. 167 (2007); Nicole Huberfeld, Pharma on 
the Hot Seat, 40 J. HEALTH L. 241 (2007). 
 159. 42 C.F.R. § 423.756(a)(1)(ii) (2007). 
 160. Id. § 423.756(f)(1-2). 
 161. Id. § 423.756(f)(2).   
 162. Id. § 423.752(a)(1). 
 163. Id. § 423.752(a)(2). 
 164. 42 C.F.R. § 423.752(a)(3) (2007). 
 165. Id. § 423.752(a)(5). 
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 refusal to renew big plans’ contracts, and 
 termination of a plan’s contract.166 
Administrative sanctions may be imposed based on harm incurred by a 
single beneficiary.167  Some CMPs can be applied to each violation or for 
each week that the violation continues.168  In contrast to the FCA, CMS’s 
regulations establish a maximum amount of civil penalties that may be 
imposed.169 
As is the case with most administrative programs, decisions to impose 
sanctions are discretionary.  To preserve the broadest possible remedial 
discretion, CMS has expressly refused to specify a formula or define the 
circumstances when sanctions will, or will not, be imposed.170  CMS, 
however, has stated that generally, and solely as a matter of policy, it will 
limit civil enforcement to “[l]arge, repeat and/or egregious . . . violations” of 
Part D requirements.171  Further, CMS, in contrast to its enforcement policy 
with most other Medicare providers, has disavowed the intent to publicly 
disclose compliance actions directed at Part D plans.172 
The enforcement policy choices already made by CMS in the Part D 
program and the range of enforcement options available, like those in the 
long term care survey and enforcement system, highlight the conflict 
between administrative oversight and enforcement and judicial enforcement 
of Part D standards through the FCA.  CMS’s enforcement policy choices, 
whether one agrees with them or not, reflect, among other things, that Part 
D created a massive Medicare benefit de novo and virtually overnight.  
Further, the policy choices appear to reflect a recognition that, unless a 
sufficient number of prescription drug plans are induced to participate, the 
Part D benefit will be unavailable. 
Despite Congress’ decision to confer on CMS the responsibility, 
authority, and discretion to make the policy choices necessary to implement 
the Part D program and to oversee the quality of long term care, CMS’s 
remedial decisions are easily trumped.  CMS’s decisions can even be 
trumped by a private individual who, for his or her own personal or 
pecuniary motives, decides to file an FCA qui tam action. 
For example, a deliberate policy choice by CMS to take limited 
enforcement action, so as not to threaten the fiscal viability of a prescription 
 
 166. Id. §§ 423.750(a), 423.752(a), 423.758. 
 167. Id. § 423.758(a). 
 168. Id. § 423.758(b). 
 169. 42 C.F.R. § 423.758(b) (2007). 
 170. 70 Fed. Reg. 4194, 4366 (Jan. 28, 2005).   
 171. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
supra note 30, at 3. 
 172. 70 Fed. Reg. at 4367. 
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drug plan that the agency believes is necessary to supply potentially 
thousands of beneficiaries, will mean very little and, perhaps, nothing, if a 
qui tam relator pursues a claim alleging that the same regulatory violations 
make the thousands of payment claims such plans typically submit false or 
fraudulent under the FCA.  Allowing FCA actions based on regulatory 
violations, despite comprehensive administrative enforcement programs, 
essentially eliminates an agency’s remedial discretion and replaces 
Congress’s menu of remedies with mandatory damages and penalties.173  
Furthermore, the cost of defending an FCA action, and the potential 
magnitude of the treble damages and per claim penalties provided by the 
Act, often make such cases “bet the company cases” that must, in the 
exercise of reasonable business judgment, be settled, whether or not the 
defendant has viable defenses. 
The ability of a private individual acting on his or her own initiative to 
institute a qui tam action when the United States would not file a damages 
claim, or to prosecute a qui tam when the United States declines to 
participate, definitely manifests the clash between the modern administrative 
state and the Civil War era FCA.174  Indeed, a successful FCA action based 
on regulatory noncompliance often will result in a court—sometimes at the 
behest of a private relator—taking away all government payments received 
by a defendant, “even though the agencies charged with the enforcement of 
Medicare statutes and regulations would not,” or could not, “have done 
so.”175 
D. Lower Courts Have Struggled to Apply the FCA to Contractors Subject 
to Complex Regulatory, Enforcement, and Remedial Programs 
Generally, the threshold question in FCA cases is whether the defendant 
actually presented a false or fraudulent claim within the meaning of the 
FCA.176  The Ninth Circuit’s schizophrenia, exemplified when Hendow and 
Anton are compared, mirrors a similar split in the decisions of other courts. 
 
 173. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Sweeney v. Manorcare Health Servs. Inc., No. C03-5320RJB, 
2005 WL 4030950, at *5-6 (W.D. Wash. March 4, 2005) (allowing “qui tam plaintiffs to 
supplant the regulatory discretion granted to HHS . . . essentially turn[s] a discretionary denial 
of payment remedy into a mandatory penalty for failure to meet Medicare requirements”); 
U.S. ex rel. Swan v. Covenant Care, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1222 (E.D. Cal. 2002) 
(same). 
 174. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Williard v. Humana Health Plan of Texas, Inc., 336 F.3d 375 
(5th Cir. 2003). 
 175. U.S. ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 459 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1088 (D. 
Kan. 2006). 
 176. See, e.g., Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1171-72 (discussing the nature of false or fraudulent 
claims). 
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Courts have used various derivatives of an “express false certification” 
theory to conclude that a contractor’s allegedly false certification of 
compliance with a federal statute or regulation renders subsequent payment 
claims false or fraudulent.177  In recognizing this theory, at least one court 
has looked to the “causal chain” leading to payment, as opposed to the 
proximity between the time of the alleged false certification and the claim for 
payment.178  Others have stated that the false certification must tie directly to 
the government’s decision to pay a claim.179 
Holding that only a subset of admittedly false claims should be subject 
to the FCA, other courts ask the additional question of whether the 
certification was in fact “material” to the government’s decision to pay the 
claim.180  However, even those courts that recognize a materiality 
requirement disagree as to what standard to apply.181 
Some courts have gone further by imposing FCA liability when an 
express certification is absent, ruling that the mere act of seeking payment 
implicitly certifies that the contractor has performed in conformance with all 
statutes and regulations.182  In contrast, other courts have expressed doubt 
about the validity of the implied false certification theory.183  In other cases, 
 
 177. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Quinn v. Omnicare Inc., 382 F.3d 432, 441 (3rd Cir. 2004) 
(noting that although the Third Circuit had not yet adopted the “certification theory” of FCA 
liability, other circuits had). 
 178. See U.S. ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 179. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Gross v. AIDS Research Alliance-Chicago, 415 F.3d 601, 605 
(7th Cir. 2005) (“False claim allegations must relate to actual money that was or might have 
been doled out by the government based upon actual and particularly-identified false 
representations.”); see also Willard, 336 F.3d at 382-83; Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah 
River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 788 (4th Cir. 1999); U.S. ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA 
Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 180. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt. Group, Inc., 400 F.3d 
428, 445 (6th Cir. 2005) (comparing the Fourth Circuit’s “natural tendency” test to the Eighth 
Circuit’s “outcome materiality” test); U.S. ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 697 (2d Cir. 
2001) (noting that the “materiality requirement holds that only a subset of admittedly false 
claims is subject to [FCA] liability”); Harrison, 176 F.3d at 788 (recognizing a “materiality” 
factor in the test for FCA liability). 
 181. See, e.g., A+ Homecare, Inc., 400 F.3d at 445 (discussing a circuit split between 
“outcome materiality” and “natural tendency” tests for determining materiality). 
 182. See, e.g., Shaw v. AAA Eng’g & Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 519, 531-32 (10th Cir. 
2000) (“Permitting FCA liability based on a false certification of compliance . . . whether the 
certification is express or implied is consistent with the legislative history of the . . . FCA.”); see 
also Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 433-34 (1994), aff’d, 57 F.3d 
1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision). 
 183. See Harrison, 176 F.3d at 787 n.8. 
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courts have held that no certification of compliance is required to support 
an FCA action.184 
Judicial discomfort and confusion about applying the FCA to heavily 
regulated entities are also reflected in other aspects of the implied false 
certification cases.  For example, some courts, although acknowledging the 
validity of the implied certification theory, have attempted to confine the 
theory’s reach by placing strict limits on its use.185  Examining these cases 
suggests that courts may be unwilling to allow an FCA case based on the 
implied certification theory to proceed unless there is evidence (or an 
allegation) of pervasive, repeated failures to comply with program 
requirements, suggesting a deliberate, willful, and even intentional 
noncompliance.186 
Lower courts’ difficulties in applying the FCA to heavily regulated 
industries is exemplified by a series of Fifth Circuit decisions involving rent 
subsidies provided by the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD).187  In Southland I, the owners of an apartment building certified, in 
their monthly requests for rent subsidies, that their building was maintained 
in a decent, safe, and sanitary condition, as HUD regulation and the 
owners’ agreement with the agency both required.188  Despite the fact that 
HUD had continued to make rent subsidy payments with full knowledge of 
the building’s defects, the government initiated an FCA suit against the 
 
 184. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Lee v. Smithkline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (“Neither false certification nor a showing of government reliance on false 
certification for payment need be proven” if the complaint alleges services were worthless.). 
 185. See, e.g., Mikes, 274 F.3d at 700 (limiting use of implied false certification theory to 
cases where the “underlying statute or regulation upon which the plaintiff relies expressly 
states” that the contractor must comply in order to get paid); U.S. ex rel. Phillips v. Permian 
Residential Care Ctr., 386 F. Supp. 2d 879, 884 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (same); U.S. ex rel. 
Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 459 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1089 (D. Kan. 2006); U.S. 
ex rel. Cooper v. Gentiva Health Servs., Inc., No. 01-508, 2003 WL 22495607, at *8 (W.D. 
Pa. Nov. 4, 2003). 
 186. Compare U.S. ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1169-70 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (allegations that defendant bragged about violation and actively deceived agency 
by maintaining two sets of books), with U.S. ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266-67 
(9th Cir. 1996) (refusing to allow implied certification case based on routine regulatory 
violations).  See also U.S. ex rel. Swan v. Covenant Care, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1221 
(E.D. Cal. 2002) (same); U.S. ex rel. Sweeney v. Manorcare Health Servs. Inc., No. C03-
5320RJB, 2005 WL 4030950, at *5-6 (W.D. Wash. March 4, 2005) (same); cf. United States 
v. NHC Health Care Corp., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (W.D. Mo. 2001) (alleging extreme 
understaffing, generalized neglect). 
 187. See United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp. (Southland I), 288 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 
2002) rev’d, United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp. (Southland II), 326 F.3d 669 (5th Cir. 
2003) (en banc). 
 188. See Southland I, 288 F.3d at 671. 
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building’s owners after they failed to rectify concerns raised by HUD 
regarding the building’s deteriorating condition.189 
In Southland I, a divided Fifth Circuit panel initially held that the FCA 
provided a viable cause of action.190  The panel decision held that “when 
the government conditions payment of a claim upon a claimant’s 
certification of compliance with a statutory or regulatory condition, a 
claimant submits a false claim as a matter of law when he or she falsely 
certifies compliance with that condition.”191  After rehearing en banc, 
however, a ten-judge majority—that included two judges from the panel 
who had initially permitted the FCA cause of action—voted, instead, that no 
FCA cause of action arose because no false claims had been submitted 
within the meaning of the FCA.192 
No false claims were submitted, the court reasoned, because the rent 
subsidy contract itself specified remedies for dealing with noncompliance 
and provided that, during such time, rent subsidy payments would 
continue.193  Moreover, the court noted that continued payments arguably 
were necessary to fund the improvements required by HUD.194 
The express and implied false certification theories have been at least 
equally problematic in cases involving the federal healthcare benefit 
programs.  For example, in Mikes v. Straus, a former employee of a 
physician practice filed suit alleging that her former employer sought and 
received Medicare reimbursement for tests that were improperly performed, 
thereby making the test results unreliable and the claims for reimbursement 
false or fraudulent.195  Because neither Congress nor the Supreme Court 
has defined “false or fraudulent,” the Second Circuit resorted to Webster’s 
Dictionary for guidance in an attempt to understand what exactly Congress 
sought to prohibit by the FCA196  and concluded that the statute was aimed 
at claims that attempted to extract money that the government otherwise 
 
 189. See id. at 673. 
 190. Id. at 669. 
 191. Id. at 678. 
 192. Southland II, 326 F.3d at 675. 
 193. See id. at 676. 
 194. Id.; see also U.S. ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex., Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 
382-83 (5th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that the “Government is merely authorized” to impose 
penalties, “rather than withhold payment for those already enrolled” in the plan); U.S. ex rel. 
Lamers v. City of Green Bay, 168 F.3d 1013, 1018-20 (7th Cir. 1999) (government was fully 
aware of violations but continued payments); U.S. ex rel. Cooper v. Gentiva Health Servs., 
Inc., No. 01-508, 2003 WL 22495607, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2003) (compliance with 
conditions of participation not a precondition to payments). 
 195. 274 F.3d 687, 693 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 196. Id. at 696. 
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would not have paid.197  The Mikes court cautioned that the FCA “does not 
encompass those instances of regulatory noncompliance that are irrelevant 
to the government’s disbursement decisions.”198  According to the Second 
Circuit, “the [FCA] was not designed for use as a blunt instrument to enforce 
compliance with all . . . regulations—but rather only those regulations that 
are a precondition to payment.”199 
The Ninth Circuit, in United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, similarly 
noted that “[i]t is not the case that any breach of contract, or violation of 
regulations or law, or receipt of money from the government where one is 
not entitled to receive the money, automatically gives rise to a claim under 
the FCA.”200  The Anton court held that in order for a regulatory violation to 
be actionable under the FCA, compliance with the regulation at issue had to 
be a sine qua non of payment, a point given short shrift in Hendow.201  
According to the Anton court, the presence of administrative remedies to 
address regulatory issues, demonstrated that compliance was not a 
precondition for payment.202 
In Hendow, by contrast, the Ninth Circuit paid obeisance to, but 
ultimately disregarded, the important distinction between those requirements 
that actually affect the government’s decision to pay and those that do 
not.203  According to the court, “if [it] held that conditions of participation 
were not conditions of payment, there would be no conditions of payment at 
all—and thus, an educational institution could flout the law at will.”204  Such 
is clearly not the case.  Rather than allowing UOP to “flout the law at will,” 
the DOE conducted an investigation and exercised its discretion to continue 
making payments to UOP and treat the school’s alleged violation of the 
regulations as a regulatory enforcement matter.205  DOE, based on its 
assessment of the best interests of program beneficiaries and the absence of 
actual harm to the government, merely took a different path than that 
provided by the FCA.206  The court, however, never even mentions the 
 
 197. Id. at 697. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 699. 
 200. 91 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 201. Id. at 1267. 
 202. Id. 
 203. See 461 F.3d 1166, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See generally id. at 1176-77 (discussing the DOE interest in the institutions’ ongoing 
conduct). 
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DOE’s actions.  In this respect, Hendow is at odds with many, and perhaps 
most courts.207 
E. Can the FCA and the Modern Administrative State Be Reconciled? 
1. The Questions That Must Be Answered 
As reflected in the Hendow-Anton split, the inconsistencies in the case 
law give rise to at least four questions that must be answered to reconcile 
the FCA with the modern administrative state: 
 First, assuming for the sake of argument that a claim for payment 
can be false or fraudulent based on a regulatory violation, is it in a 
court’s province to determine whether the predicate regulatory 
violation exists when Congress has committed such decisions to 
agency discretion? 
 
 207. See U.S. ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex., Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 382-83 
(5th Cir. 2003) (noting that compliance with regulations is not a condition of payment 
because, if defendant violated regulations, “the Government is merely authorized to suspend 
future enrollment, suspend future payments, or impose monetary penalties, rather than 
withhold payment for those already enrolled.”); Anton, 91 F.3d at 1267 (“[R]egulatory 
compliance was not a sine qua non of receipt of state funding.  There are administrative and 
other remedies for regulatory violations.”); U.S. ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., 
Inc., 459 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087 (D. Kan. 2006) (“Denial of government payment is not the 
exclusive remedy . . . in the event of a regulatory violation”; CMS has “discretionary authority 
whether to impose sanctions in a particular case,” therefore payment not conditioned on 
compliance with regulations); U.S. ex rel. Sweeney v. Manorcare Health Servs., Inc., No. C03-
5320RJB, 2005 WL 4030950, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 4, 2005) (availability of regulatory 
and other remedies other than denial of payment shows that payment not conditioned on 
regulatory compliance; allowing case to proceed would permit qui tam relator to supplant 
agency discretion); U.S. ex rel. Cooper v. Gentiva Health Servs., Inc., No. 01-508, 2003 WL 
22495607, at *8-9 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2003) (Regulations providing for prospective 
revocation of billing privileges rather than retrospective denial of payment shows payment not 
conditioned on regulatory compliance); U.S. ex rel. Ortega v. Columbia Healthcare, Inc., 240 
F. Supp. 2d 8, 19 (D.D.C. 2003) (Loss of accreditation triggers inspection, not loss of 
entitlement to payment showing that accreditation is not a precondition to payment); U.S. ex 
rel. Swan v. Covenant Care, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1222 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (Variety of 
sanctions, other than denial of payment and discretion to choose whether to impose any 
sanction for regulatory violation shows regulatory compliance is not condition of payment; 
allowing FCA action “where HHS may choose to waive administrative remedies, or impose a 
less drastic sanction than full denial of payment . . . would improperly permit qui tam plaintiffs 
to supplant the regulatory discretion granted to HHS under the Social Security Act.”); see, e.g., 
United States v. Dan Caputo Co., 152 F.3d 1060, 1062 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing U.S. ex rel. 
Windsor v. DynCorp., Inc., 895 F. Supp. 844, 851-52 (E.D. Va. 1995)) (permitting jury in 
FCA case to decide key issue would circumvent administrative scheme); U.S. ex rel. Local 
Union No. 217 v. G.E. Chen Constr., Inc., 954 F. Supp. 195, 197 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (same); 
cf. V.N.A. of Greater Tift County, Inc. v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 1020, 1027 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(discussing the administrative procedures yet to be taken in the case). 
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 Second, because administrative agencies use their own unique and 
generally informal procedures (or the procedures and protocols 
mandated by Congress) to determine the existence of regulatory 
violations, is it appropriate for courts to determine the predicate 
regulatory violation using the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
the Federal Rules of Evidence? 
 Third, because statutes creating public benefit programs rely on 
administrative agencies’ expertise to select a discretionary response 
to a regulatory violation and often permit continued payment for 
services despite alleged or actual violations, is it appropriate for a 
court to use the FCA to recoup as damages payments that the 
enforcement agency has not found inappropriate? 
 Finally, if it is appropriate for courts to allow FCA actions brought 
directly by the government in the circumstances described above, is it 
nonetheless inappropriate to permit such actions to be brought by 
private relators, who are complete strangers to the discretion that 
Congress conferred on an administrative agency to weigh the nature 
of any violation, consider the competing interests, and decide what, 
if any, enforcement action is appropriate? 
2. Easy Answers Are Not Always Accurate Answers: Misplaced Reliance 
on a 1986 Senate Report 
Rather than applying traditional principles of statutory construction and 
determining the meaning given to “false or fraudulent” by the 1863 
Congress that wrote and adopted the terms, most courts that have 
recognized the false certification theory rest their decisions on a 1986 
Senate committee report.  These courts say the report evidences that the 
words “false or fraudulent” should be broadly construed to include claims 
based on statutory and regulatory violations.208  For example, the Ninth 
Circuit in Hendow explained that “in amending the [FCA] in 1986, 
Congress emphasized that the scope of false or fraudulent claims should be 
broadly construed.”209 
 
 208. See U.S. ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 697 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing S. REP. 
NO. 99-345, at 9 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5274, for the 
proposition that “a false claim” includes one for goods or services “provided in violation of . . 
. regulation”); Shaw v. AAA Eng’g & Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 519, 531 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(same); Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 786 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(same). 
 209. Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1170-71.  “[E]ach and every claim submitted under a contract, 
loan guarantee, or other agreement which was originally obtained by means of false 
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Courts relying on the 1986 Senate report overlook a critical fact pointed 
out in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. 
Stevens.210  In Stevens, the Supreme Court found the same 1986 Senate 
report to be of no value in discerning the meaning of terms that were not 
added to the FCA in 1986 or otherwise amended by the 1986 Congress.211 
Stevens addressed whether the FCA’s use of the word “person” included 
a state.212  Like the terms “false or fraudulent,” the term “person” was 
adopted in the original 1863 Act and remains unamended in the current 
FCA.213  Ruling that a state was not a person, the Court flatly rejected 
language in Senate Report 99-345 to the contrary.214 
The portion of Senate Report 99-345 at issue in Stevens purported to 
describe the law as it existed at the time Congress enacted the 1986 
amendments.215  However, according to the Court, the passage did nothing 
more than “set[] forth a Senate Committee’s (erroneous) understanding of 
the meaning of the statutory term enacted some 123 years earlier.”216  
Similarly, that 1986 Senate report’s sweeping pronouncements on the 
meaning of “false or fraudulent”—words that originated in the 1863 Act—
should be of little or no value. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has not yet determined how the FCA should be 
applied in the context of heavily regulated government contractors who are 
confronted with thousands of pages of statutes and agency regulations, 
manuals, and other informal guidance.  For example, the Court has not 
determined how falsity should be defined in the regulatory context, nor has it 
addressed the effect private initiation of FCA actions has on programs 
whose administration is committed to agency discretion by Congress.217 
The lack of guidance can be especially problematic for Medicare and 
Medicaid providers.  The statutory and regulatory framework that healthcare 
providers, such as nursing homes and Part D plans, operate within 
 
statements or other corrupt or fraudulent conduct, or in violation of any statute or applicable 
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demonstrates that periodic non-compliance is anticipated and built into the 
administration of the Medicare and Medicaid programs.  To illustrate, at the 
time the Hendow opinion was issued, nursing homes in the nine states 
comprising the Ninth Circuit averaged nine regulatory deficiencies on their 
annual surveys.218  Yet, these nursing homes rarely are denied Medicare or 
Medicaid payment for the services provided to beneficiaries of those 
programs.219 
Payment for services when a healthcare provider violates one or more of 
the hundreds of Medicare and Medicaid requirements is rarely refused 
because, just like imposition of multiple damages and penalties in an FCA 
action, such action diverts resources from patient services, limits the 
resources available to improve care, and may well delay or preclude 
improvement.220  Such a result is at odds with Congress’s purpose in 
adopting a range of intermediate sanctions.  Congress’s goal, and the 
fundamental purpose of the alternative remedies used in the course of 
administering the Medicare and Medicaid programs, is to create incentives 
for providers to quickly come back into substantial compliance with program 
requirements and avoid terminating payment for services and forcing 
nursing home residents to be transferred to other facilities.  Allowing the 
FCA to be used to redress violations of Medicare and Medicaid 
participation requirements circumvents congressional policy.  As the District 
Court for the Eastern District of California explained in United States ex rel. 
Swan v. Covenant Care, Inc.: 
  To allow FCA suits to proceed where government payment of Medicare 
claims is not conditioned on perfect regulatory compliance—and where 
HHS may choose to waive administrative remedies, or impose a less drastic 
sanction than full denial of payment—would improperly permit qui tam 
plaintiffs to supplant the regulatory discretion granted to HHS under [federal 
law], essentially turning a discretionary denial of payment remedy into a 
mandatory penalty for failure to meet Medicare requirements.221 
The number of FCA lawsuits has grown dramatically over the past two 
decades.222  The healthcare industry has faced the brunt of this upsurge and 
 
 218. This average can be obtained by looking at the data for each of the nine states that 
comprise the Ninth Circuit available at Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Nursing Home 
Compare, www.medicare.gov/NHCompare (last visited Jan 31, 2008). 
 219. Cf. Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 22 (2000) 
(terminations from the Medicare and Medicaid programs are rare.). 
 220. Cf. United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp. (Southland II), 326 F.3d 669, 680 (5th 
Cir. 2003) (en banc) (discussing similar problems with imposing penalties for violations of 
HUD program). 
 221. 279 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1222 (E.D. Cal. 2002). 
 222. See Letter from Laurie E. Ekstrand, Dir., Homeland Security & Justice, U.S. Gov’t 
Accountability Office, to Rep. Sensenbrenner, Rep. Cannon, & Sen. Grassley, Subject: 
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implementation of the Part D prescription drug program is likely to 
precipitate even more FCA actions directed at healthcare providers.223 
While the United States government pursues about one-third of those 
lawsuits, relators prosecute many of the remaining actions alone, motivated 
in part by the statute’s contingent bounty provision and not constrained by 
concerns about the impact their suits will have on the larger healthcare 
delivery system.224  Relators effectively usurp agency authority and discretion 
and may exalt punishment and pecuniary gain over all other considerations.  
Moreover, the overwhelming majority of the healthcare qui tam cases that 
the United States does not prosecute produce no recovery for the United 
States (or the relator) and a substantial number of those cases are 
dismissed, but only after burdensome and expensive pre-trial litigation.225 
The fact that FCA enforcement policy is shaped in large part by self-
deputized relators who sue on behalf of the government amplifies the need 
for definitive guidance reconciling the FCA and administrative regulatory 
and enforcement programs.  Such persons wield extraordinary power and 
make important decisions in qui tam litigation that affect the public interest.  
Yet, relators have no obligation to serve any interest but their own. 
The financial consequences of running afoul of the FCA can be 
extraordinary.  The statute not only provides for treble damages, it also 
authorizes penalties of up to $11,000 per claim.226  Lack of clarity regarding 
what constitutes a false or fraudulent claim within the meaning of the FCA 
often places extreme pressure on companies to settle otherwise unmeritorious 
suits to avoid risking financial ruin caused by an adverse ruling under the FCA.  
Because so much of healthcare delivered in the United States is paid for by the 
federal government, this situation is not good for the providers or for the 
public. 
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